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ARTICLES

FIRST, "LET'S KILL ALL THE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWXTFRS!":
MUSINGS ON THE DECLINE AND FALL OF
THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EMPIRE
*

DORIS ESTELLE LONG

The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers...
Dick the Butcher'

Do not call liberty what in reality is no more than license and
piracy.
Louis Jacob'
Like Shakespeare in King Henry VI, when the cry of Dick the
Butcher to "first ... kill all the lawyers" was directed to creating
havoc in civilized society,' the current trend to "kill" (or at least
. Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. The author would
like to thank Dean Robert Gilbert Johnston and Associate Dean John Corkery
for the research grant that supported the development of this Article. She
would also like to thank Karen Long, whose love of silent movies first led the
author to discover the patent wars that dominated early technological
developments in the Twentieth Century motion picture industry. In addition,
she would like to thank numerous colleagues in the copyright industry,
academia, and practitioner "world" who over the years have engaged in
countless debates with the author and helped to shape the views contained in
this Article.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH

act 4, sc. 2.
IN
POLITICS
CULTURAL
AND
PUBLISHING
HESSE,
2. CARLA
REVOLUTIONARY PARIS, 1789 - 1810, 214 (1991) (quoting Jacob L'ain6 in Ides

g~ndrales sur les causes de ian~antissement de ientrepreneur). Hesse
discussed the post-revolutionary clamor for re-regulation of the French
printing industry after its collapse in the early 1800's. Id.
3. See SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1. The "suggestion" appeared as part of
comedic interchange between two secondary characters that preceded the
murder of a law clerk. Id. The significance of the line has been hotly debated.
Some suggest that in fact the line is merely an example of lawyer bashing by
Shakespeare. Seth Finkelstein, "The first thing we do, let's kill all the
lawyers" - it's a lawyer joke, THE ETHICAL SPECTACLE (July 1997), at
http://www.spectacle.org/797/finkel.html. Others have properly suggested that
the line demonstrates that lawyers (or more precisely the law) must be
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"seriously wound") intellectual property protection is designed to
wreak havoc on those forces which have contributed most directly
to the present position of the United States as a premiere exporter
of technology and intellectual property based products.4
This Article examines current trends at reducing intellectual
property protection both domestically and internationally.
It
contends that such reductions in protection are particularly
harmful to the incentivizing role of intellectual property and the
ability of developing countries to obtain the economic benefits of
such incentives.
These trends are not limited to efforts at
legalizing piracy or expanding uncompensated public welfare uses
of intellectual property. To the contrary, they include disturbing
trends in domestic protection that include resurrection of the
discredited election doctrine. Such trends must be reversed and
an appropriate balance between creators' rights and public access
struck before the economic and technological harm caused by
reduced protection becomes irreversible.
Part I of this Article examines the historic and economic role
of intellectual property in incentivizing creativity. Part II briefly
describes the scope of current hostility to intellectual property
rights ("IPRs") protection and some of the historic bases for this
hostility. Part III develops the positive relationship between
creativity incentivization and wealth production encouraged by
strong IPR protection. Part IV examines the balance required
between IPR incentivization and public welfare needs to establish
a workable international protection system. Part V describes
current hostility to IPR protection in the United States, including
in particular the unfortunate resurrection of the obligation of
election. Part VI suggests changes in protection that must be
achieved in order to reconfigure the currently harmful balance
between incentivization and public welfare. Finally, the Article
recommends that the trend toward election and present hostility
to IPR protection be promptly reversed. It further recommends
studies to quantify the incentivizing aspects of IPR protection
internationally. Critical balances between incentivization and
eliminated before revolution and subsequent societal chaos can occur. Walter
D. Posey, The First Thing We Do, Let's Kill All the Lawyers: Plan of Action Or
Misquoted Epigram?,30 UWLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1999).
4. The so-called "copyright" or "cultural" industries include the motion
picture, software, music and book publishing industries. STEPHEN E. SIWEK,
COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE 2000 REPORT n.1 at 3, 5
(Executive
Summary
2000),
available
at
http://www.iipa.com/copyright-us-economy.html. These industries are among

the largest IP-based domestic exporting industries in the United States. Id.
They contribute an estimated $677.9 billion to the U.S. economy,
approximately 7.33% of the Gross Domestic Product. Id. For a discussion of
the incentivizing nature of intellectual property protection and its contribution
to this economic bonanza, see infra text accompanying note 10.
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public welfare must be determined in an objective manner.
Globalization and internationalization of laws require no less.
I.

"KILLING" INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS
In an era notable for the rapid pace of technological
developments in the arenas of manufacturing and distribution, as
well as in the communications media,5 intellectual property laws6

5. For a discussion identifying the most notable advances at the latter end
of the century in the areas of manufacturing and communications media,
including advances in robotic and computerized reproduction, digital
manufacturing (including compact and laser disc technology), digital
distribution product ordering and distribution systems, and in the areas of
global electronic mail and messaging systems, satellite television and the
rapid spread of the Internet as a source for global communication and
information dissemination, as well as for e-business and e-commerce models,
see e.g.,

JANET ABBATE,

INVENTING THE

INTERNET

(1999);

JAMES

E.

MCCLELLAN III & HAROLD DORN, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN WORLD
HISTORY: AN INTRODUCTION (1999); TOM STANDAGE, THE VICTORIAN
INTERNET: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF THE TELEGRAPH AND THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY'S ON-LINE PIONEERS (1998); BRIAN WINSTON, MEDIA

TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY: A HISTORY: FROM THE TELEGRAPH TO THE
INTERNET (1998). For an interesting article on the Internet revolution and its
impact on business and communications, see Diane Bentley, rEvolution!, 8
HEATHROW INT'L TRAVELLER 55 (2001). The article listed the Internet
"revolution" as one of the top ten revolutions in history along with the
Industrial Revolution, the American Revolution, the Russian Revolution and
the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Id.
6. For purposes of this Article, the definition of "intellectual property" to
has been limited to broader categories of traditionally acknowledged
intellectual property forms.
These forms include patents, copyrights,
trademarks, trade secrets and industrial designs. The same five categories
that were the historic focus of both domestic and international protection
regimes. Most internationally recognized intellectual property treaty regimes,
including the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, the Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial Property, and the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, protect these five categories. Moreover,
these five categories generally subsume, at least in part, newer forms of
intellectual property protection such as geographic indications and
(potentially) "traditional knowledge" (at least in certain forms). Historically,
these traditional forms served as the focus for most of the debates over
ownership versus public access. They presently serve as the main focus of
such debates today. See discussion infra Parts III, IV.
"Copyright" generally protects works of artistic, literary and musical
"expression," including, for example, novels, paintings, music, and
choreography. See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, July 14, 1967, art. 2, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, 227 (defining
copyrightable subject matter as "every production in the literary, scientific and
artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression").
Protection under copyright is limited to the expressions contained in the
protected works and does not extend to the ideas contained therein. Id. See
also Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, art. 9, 33 I.L.M. 81, 87
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are under concentrated attack. Historically, intellectual property
laws in the United States have served as the bulwark for
encouraging and protecting human innovation and creativity.7
From pre-constitutional copyright statutes that cited "the
Improvement of Knowledge [and] the progress of Civilization...
[which] greatly depend on the Efforts of learned and ingenious
[hereinafter TRIPS] (incorporating by reference the definition of copyrightable
works under Art. 2 of the Berne Convention).
"Patent" law generally protects novel, non-obvious and useful
inventions. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra, art. 27(1), 33 I.L.M. at 93-94 (establishing
a tripartite test that requires patent protection for inventions that are "new,
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application"). Patent
protection generally extends to machines, articles of manufacture, processes,
chemical or electrical structures and compositions, and the like, and in some
countries, such as the United States and Japan, it extends to novel methods of
doing business. See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, 149
F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that a method for processing
financial data using a mathematical algorithm to perform mutual funds
accounting and administration was eligible for patent protection under U.S.
law).
"Trademark" law generally protects corporate symbols, logos and other
distinctive indicia of the origin or goods or services. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra,
art. 15(1), 33 I.L.M. at 89 (defining a trademark as "any sign, or any
combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one
undertaking from those of other undertakings"). Among the types of sourcedesignators generally protected internationally are word marks, commercial
logos, and other visible "signs" that are used to distinguish the goods or
services.
"Trade secrets" law generally protects confidential information that has
some commercial or economic value as a result of its secret nature and for
which the owner has taken reasonable steps to protect the secret nature of this
information. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra, art. 39(2), 33 I.L.M. at 98 (defining
protected information as that which has "commercial value because it is
secret" and for which its owner took "reasonable steps" to protect its
confidential nature).
"Industrial designs" and "utility models" generally include works and
inventions which do not meet the requirements for patent or copyright
protection, but which demonstrate some degree of novelty or originality,
respectively, to warrant some level of protection. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra, art.
25(1), 33 I.L.M. at 93 (requiring members to protect "independently created
industrial designs that are new or original").
7. The "Patents and Copyright Clause" of the U.S. Constitution is the
basis for federal copyright and patent laws when it provides: "Congress shall
have the power. . . 'To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries."' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. For a
further discussion of the historical basis for this clause, see infra notes 8-9, 21
and accompanying text. For a suggestion that the Patents and Copyright
Clause is based on a natural right (as opposed to an instrumentalist view), see
John 0. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First
Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 80 (1996). McGinnis contends that "text of
the [Intellectual Property] Clause reads as if it were protecting a natural
right, but protecting it only to the extent that enforcement through statute
would rebound to society's benefit." Id.
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Persons,"8 to the Patents and Copyrights Clause of the United
States Constitution, which premised protection on the role of
intellectual property to "encourage the progress of science and
useful Arts,"9 United States law has long recognized the
incentivizing necessity of intellectual property protection to fuel
technological and creative advances.'0
This recognition of the
8. Francine Crawford, Pre-Constitutional Copyright Statutes, 47 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 167, 170 (2000). A pre-constitutional Massachusetts statute
further emphasized that the "principal Encouragement" for such efforts "must
exist in the legal Security of the Fruits of their Study and Industry to
themselves." Id. This rationale was repeated in almost all colonial statutes.
Id. See also infra text accompanying note 10.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City
Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (noting that the Constitution authorizes
Congress to grant copyright protection "to motivate the creative activity of
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the
public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of
exclusive control has expired").
10. For a discussion of the incentivizing effects of intellectual property, see
e.g., SHAHID ALIKHAN, SOCIO-ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY PROTECTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2000); HISAMITSU ARAI,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICIES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE
JAPANESE EXPERIENCE IN WEALTH CREATION (1999); THOMAS P. HUGHES,
AMERICAN GENESIS: A CENTURY OF INVENTION AND TECHNOLOGICAL
ENTHUSIASM 1870-1970 (1989); KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2000); Martin J. Adelman, The Supreme

Court, Market Structure, and Innovation: Chakrabarty,Rohm and Haas, 27
ANTITRUST BULL. 457 (1982); Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of
Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement
Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (1989); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325
(1989); Robert P. Merges, Toward A Third Intellectual Property Paradigm:
Comments: Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 2655 (1994); Barry Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright
Protectionfor Published Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REV.
1100 (1971); Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts:
American Patent Law and Administration, 1787-1836, 80 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 11 (1998).

The economic desirability of intellectual

property laws has long been subject to harsh debate. See, e.g., Thomas
MaCaulay, The First Speech on Copyright (Feb. 5, 1841), in MACAULAY'S
SPEECHES ON COPYRIGHT AND LINCOLN'S ADDRESS AT COOPER UNION 18

(Charles Robert Gaston ed., 1914) (opposing a bill to extend the duration of
copyright protection).
See also Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for
Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer
Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 350 (1970) (concluding that the "case for
copyright protection is weak"). For a good overview of current economic
analyses regarding copyright protection, and the difficulties in ascertaining
with precision the precise scope of protection needed to create optimal
economic conditions for innovation and dissemination, see RICHARD WATT,
COPYRIGHT AND ECONOMIC THEORY: FRIENDS OR FOES? (2000).

An in-depth analysis of the economic basis for protection is beyond the
scope of this Article. Nevertheless, given the current dominance of the United
States in the export of copyrighted works, see supra note 4, it seems axiomatic
that some positive connection between the two exists. While the precise
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incentivizing nature of intellectual property protection is not
limited to the United States. To the contrary, the "utilitarian"
nature of intellectual property in encouraging learning and
progress was recognized even in such a natural law and author's
rights country as France. During the French Revolution, when the
sacred relationship between authors and their works was
established, the utilitarian nature of such protection lay at its
heart.
Joseph Lakanal, in introducing a successful resolution to the
National Convention for acknowledging an author's rights (as
opposed to those of a publisher or theatre director), stressed the
role between such protection and encouraging creative activity.
He stated:
Citizens, of all the forms of property the least susceptible to contest,
whose growth cannot harm republican equality, or cast doubt upon
liberty, is property in the productions of genius .... By what fatality
is it necessary that the man of genius, who consecrates his efforts to
the instruction of his fellow citizens, should have nothing to promise
himself but a sterile glory and should be deprived of his claim to
legitimate recompense for his noble labors?11
Despite the undeniable relationship between intellectual
property protection and the encouragement of innovation and its
economical benefits in both the domestic and international arena,
intellectual property protection appears to be losing ground.
Hostility to the incentivizing role of intellectual property
protection has mounted in recent years. At the same time, the
expansion of the public domain as the source of the building blocks
for creativity has been assiduously promoted, almost to the point
of placing new
works into the public domain to be used by the next
12
new creator.
boundaries of such connections may be subject to dispute, even those who
predict the death of copyright recognize its incentivizing properties in certain

cases.

Robert C. Denicola, Mostly Dead?

Copyright Law in the New

Millennium, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 193 (2000).
11. HESSE, supra note 2, at 119-120.
12. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990)

(stressing in her seminal analysis of the public domain the need to protect and
expand the scope of the public domain by re-evaluating the scope of copyright
protection). Litman states:
Because copyright's paradigm of authorship credits the author with
bringing something wholly new into the world, it sometimes fails to
account for the raw material that all authors use. This tendency can
distort our understanding of the interaction between copyright law and

authorship. Specifically, it can lead us to give short shrift to the public
domain by failing to appreciate that the public domain is the law's
primary safeguard of the raw material that makes authorship possible.
Id. at 967. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAw
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY

(1996) (challenging

the "propertization" of copyright and contending that such strong protection
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harms the public domain); Yochai Benkler, Free As the Air to Common Use:
FirstAmendment Constraintson Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 354 (1999) (contending that current constraints on the public domain in
cyberspace harms necessary access to information); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in
Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management", 97 MICH.
L. REV. 462 (1998) (suggesting that a limited rights regime in cyberspace more
appropriately promotes market development by adequately protecting public
access to works to encourage their use). For a discussion of how the expansion
of the public domain, at the expense of strong copyright protection, is not
limited to domestic regimes, but urged in the international arena as well on
grounds of public welfare and social justice, see Ruth Gana Okediji, Copyright
and Public Welfare in Global Perspective, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 117
(1999); Ruth Okediji, Toward an InternationalFair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75 (2000). See also infra notes 77-94 and accompanying text
(discussing the public interest balance struck under the United States fair use
doctrine as currently applied). Claims for weakened protection through the
expansion of a "fair use" right have included fair use for patents. Maureen A.
O'Rourke, Toward A Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1177 (2000). Similar claims have been made for the "fair use" of trademarks
beyond traditional statutory provisions. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive
Genericity: TrademarksAs Language in the Pepsi Generation,65 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 397 (1990).
Case law similarly reflects an expansionist view of the public domain in
the arena of fair use. With the formal adoption by the United States Supreme
Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994), of the
"transformative use" test for parodies, the right to use works to create
commercially competitive works expanded to the point where the
unauthorized use of copyrighted characters is now justified under the rubric of
"parody" and "free speech." See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,
136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001), vacated, 252 F.3d 1165, 1166 (11th Cir.
2001) (vacating the lower court's injunction on the grounds of unconstitutional
prior restraint under the First Amendment with no discussion of the grounds
for such ruling). Like "genericide" for trademarks, creation of a popular
character may result in the dedication of that character to the public domain.
The view of the public domain as providing "democratic access to a
common cultural inheritance on which no particular claim could be made"
dates at least from Condorcet and the French Revolution. HESSE, supra note
2, at 121. Instead of being perceived as the enemy of the public, the author
was imbued with the nature of a public servant whose activities actually
contributed to the public domain by creating new works that, after the
expiration of their period of protection, would be part of the public domain. Id.
at 121-22. But see Andre Kerever, The French Revolution and Authors'Rights,
141 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTUER 9 (1989) (stressing the
emphasis of the July 1793 decree in the dedication to the public of the
copyrighted works at the expiry of the term of protection). This contributory
nature of an author's activities seems largely ignored in the present debates.
Some uncompensated fair uses of copyrighted works are necessary to
assure a proper balance between the author's rights to control her work, and
the public's right to access and use. See infra notes 79-99 and accompanying
text. Realistically, science, arts and knowledge cannot progress if no one can
build on what came before. Yet, the talisman of "transformative use" seems to
trump any consideration of the potential market impact, or more precisely, the
free rider effect that certain so-called transformative uses may have. I am not
convinced that the line which Justice Kennedy draws in Acuff-Rose regarding
satire versus parody is a completely workable solution. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S.
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International piracy levels remain high in nearly all fields.
The International Intellectual Property Association ("I.I.P.A.")
reported global losses in the copyright industry in 1999 of
Rates of piracy in some
approximately $2 to $22 billion. 3
countries remain nearly 90%, with countries such as Bolivia,
Brazil, Paraguay, the People's Republic of China, Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand marking nearly 100%
piracy rates last year in certain industries. 4 According to a recent
report by the International Planning and Research Corp.
("I.P.R.C."), the United States software industry lost nearly $3.2
billion to software piracy in 1999, with an estimated loss of
106,000 jobs, representing $5 billion in lost wages."
Global piracy is not limited to developing and least developed
countries where economic conditions may explain, if not excuse,
reliance on pirated works due to their lower cost."
To the
contrary, the Motion Picture Association of America ("M.P.A.A.")
reported that off-line video piracy levels in the United States in
2000 caused approximately $250 million in losses. 7 The Recording
at 596 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Nevertheless, some predictable balance
needs to be struck between permissible and impermissible free riders. There
is a difference between "standing on the shoulders of giants" and ripping off
those giants for the sake of personal financial gain. While plagiarism has a
long, and relatively fruitful history, see infra note 58, thoughtful limits must
be established to assure that the incentivizing purposes of protection have
value.
13. Int'l Intell. Prop. Alliance, 2001 SPECIAL 301 REPORT (Feb. 18, 2000), at
2, available at http://www.iipa.com/special301.html.
14. Id. at Appendix A. The industry informally refers to many countries as
"single program countries" since only one lawful copy of software was
apparently sold. This single copy, in turn, serves as the source of all
remaining illegal copies in the countries. While the story is no doubt
apocryphal, the point seems supported by the nearly 100 percent piracy rates
in some countries. According to the statistics contained in the Special 301
Report filed with the Office of United States Trade Representative ("U.S.T.R.")
in February 2001, Bolivia has 100% and Ukraine has 99% piracy in the motion
picture industry; Brazil has 98% piracy in sound recordings; Paraguay,
Indonesia and the People's Republic of China have 99%, and Malaysia,
Thailand and the Philippines have 98% piracy in entertainment (non-business
application) software. Id.
15. Press Release, Bus. Software Alliance, First Guilty Verdict Under NET
Act
Draws
Praise
(May
15,
2001),
available
at
http://www.bsa.org/usa/press/newsreleases/2001-05-15.553.phtml.
16. Because the pirate's costs do not include any of the development and
marketing costs that generally mark the launch of newly created software,
film or sound recordings, the lower costs are axiomatic. In addition, pirates
generally do not pay any local taxes or worry about the quality of their
productions. Thus, a pirated copy is not always the equivalent of its legal
alternative, even with today's digital reproduction techniques.
I have
personally viewed many pirated DVD's and VCD's of various films produced in
diverse countries where the sound or picture quality was extremely poor, to
the point where the film was nearly unwatchable.
17. Motion Picture
Ass'n
of Am.,
Anti-Piracy, available at
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Industry Association of America ("R.I.A.A.") similarly reported
losses of over $1 million per day due to piracy in the United
States. 8 Furthermore, these levels of piracy do not account for
revenue lost as a result of the widespread availability of illegally
distributed copyrighted works via sites such as Napster (preinjunction), 9 Gnutella, Aimster, Warez, Scour and other Internet
sites 20
.
On the domestic front, voices are increasingly raised against
the strong enforcement of intellectual property rights. At the
founding of the republic, the United States perceived protection of
these rights as critical to the promotion of learning and economic
growth. 2' Now, some criticize these protections for stifling the very
http://www.mpaa.org/anti-piracy/content.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2001).
Worldwide piracy was estimated to cost $2.5 billion per year. Id. Neither of
these figures includes losses as a result of illegal Internet distribution.
Admittedly the estimated figures for piracy cited in this Article should
not be relied on for their unerring accuracy. The methods for estimating such
losses are questionable at best. Industries are being asked to prove a negative
(how many CD's didn't you sell this year?). The problematic nature of
international enforcement efforts, which makes the collection of hard data
even more difficult, magnifies this problem. I visited numerous countries in
Asia, Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe where the illegal copies
of software, music and films filling the markets were too numerous to count.
In fact, in many countries, even retail stores sell pirated goods.
Although accurate estimates are difficult to obtain, the limited hard
data regarding seizures of pirated goods and destruction of production lines
seem to indicate that such figures accurately reflect the magnitude, if not the
precise amount, of the problem. See, e.g., Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., U.S.
and
International
Antipiracy
Reports
(2001),
available
at
www.riaa.orglProtect-Campaign-3.cfm (reporting seizures of 300,700 pirated
and bootleg sound recordings during the first six months in 1999 in the United
States, such seizures excluding music videos and Internet piracy). This is a
remarkable figure in a country with the lowest reported global piracy rate.
18. Id. This figure includes only offline piracy (unauthorized reproduction
of phonorecords and compact disks by plants and other manufacturing
facilities) and does not include estimated losses as a result of illegal Internet
distribution or so-called "personal use" copies.
19. For a more detailed discussion of the Napster case, see infra notes 92,
96 and accompanying text.
20. Napster, Gnutella and Aimster are well-known web sites for peer-topeer sharing of files of primarily copyrighted sound recordings. "Warez" is a
generic term applied to the numerous web sites that offer illegal copies of
software. "Scour" was the name of a web site that provided downloads of
motion pictures. In addition to individual web sites that provide access to
illegally reproduced works, auction sites such as e-Bay often sell counterfeit
software.
21. See supra notes 7-9 supra and accompanying text. For a historical
discussion of how every colony except Delaware already had copyright statutes
that gave authors the right to protect their books, pamphlets and other works
at the time the Patents and Copyrights Clause of the U.S. Constitution was
adopted, see e.g., BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND
COPYRIGHT LAW (1967); BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF
COPYRIGHT (1967); LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL
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innovation the Founders intended to encourage. Indeed, some
scholars suggest that the protection of copyrighted expression
potentially violates free speech guarantees of the First
Amendment.22

PERSPECTIVE (1968); Crawford, supra note 8; Frank D. Prager, A History of
Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787, 26 J. PATENT OFF. SOC'Y 711 (1944).

See also Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in
Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991 (1990) (analyzing the

public/private protection values embodied in various pre-revolution colonial
acts, which placed the author's interests before those of the public).
According to Patterson, early colonial statutes, the Patents and
Copyright Clause, the first federal copyright statute, and the first significant
Supreme Court decision concerning copyright protection, Wheaton v. Peters,
33 U.S. 591 (1834), reflected four basic ideas as to the purpose of copyright
protection. These four basic ideas were: "that copyright is to protect the
author's rights; that copyright is to promote learning; that copyright is to
provide order in the book trade as a government grant; and that copyright is to
prevent harmful monopoly." PATTERSON, supra, at 181. Each of these four
purposes were reflected to varying degrees in each of the four significant legal
developments in early U.S. copyright protection. Id. Securing the author's
right in his work was the primary purpose of state statutes that were in
existence prior to the Patents and Copyright Clause. Id. at 182. The Patents
and Copyright Clause had as its primary purpose the promotion of learning.
Id. at 193. The first federal copyright statute, enacted in 1790, had as its
primary purpose the creation of a statutory grant to provide order in the book
trade. Id. at 197-98. Wheaton had as its primary purpose the protection of
author's rights. Id. at 208-209.
Despite what on its surface appears to be a splintering of rationale for
copyright protection, closer analysis seems to indicate a historic convergence of
thought. During the Constitutional Convention, both James Madison and
Charles Pinckney submitted proposed lists of power for the general legislature
that included the promotion of learning in connection with the grant of
copyright and/or patent rights. Id. at 192. Madison's list included among its
powers "[t]o secure to literary authors their copyrights for a limited time. To
establish a university. To encourage, by premiums and provisions, the
advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries." Id.
Pinckney similarly listed the following among his list of legislative
powers: "[t]o establish seminaries for the promotion of literature, and the arts
and sciences ....

To grant patents for useful inventions. To secure to authors

exclusive rights for a limited time." Id. at 193. The Convention referred the
proposals to a committee that subsequently recommended the language for the
Patents and Copyrights Clause. Id. The Clause was adopted without debate.
Id. Despite the paucity of evidence, it appears from both the language of the
Clause itself and from its history, that promotion of progress and learning was
one of the key goals of copyright protection. Id. at 193-94. The Statute of
Anne, which certainly influenced pre-Constitutional U.S. copyright law, see
supra notes 7-9, was entitled "An Act for the Encouragement of Learning by
vesting the Copies of printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such
Copies, during the Times herein mentioned," further supports this conclusion.
Id. at 145 (emphasis in original). Similarly, the title of the first federal
copyright act was "An Act for the encouragement of Learning, by securing the
copies of maps, charts, and books to the authors and proprietors of such copies,
during the times therein mentioned." Id. at 197.
22. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
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This is not the first time that intellectual property laws have
come under strenuous attack. As Sheldon Halpern recognized,
"[hiostility to copyright has a long and honorable history."23 Thus,
in an oft-cited speech, Lord Thomas McCaulay argued that while
copyright might be necessary to ensure a "supply of good books,"'
the monopoly that it imposed was at best a necessary evil. He
warned, "[flor the sake of the good we must submit to the evil; but
the evil ought not to last a day longer than is necessary for the
purpose of securing the good."25
Challenges to intellectual
property protection, followed by re-examination and reestablishment of a degree of prior protection, appear to constitute
an historic pattern.
Great Britain enacted the Statute of Anne, the first copyright
statute to grant rights to authors, in 1709.26 Britain enacted the
statute in response to the "chaos"27 to the British book publishing
industry brought on by the lapse of the Licensing Act of 1662.2
Similarly, in an effort to free printed words from the barbarous
restraints of censorship, the early days of the French Revolution

Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 241 (1998)

(suggesting that preliminary injunctions in all copyright cases violate the First
Amendment's prohibition against prior restraints).

See also Harper & Row

Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (noting that
copyright and the First Amendment serve countervailing principles); Suntrust
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2001) (vacating a

preliminary injunction in a copyright infringement case as an unconstitutional
prior restraint in violation of First Amendment free speech guarantees);
Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(demonstrating that First Amendment challenges under copyright cases have
expanded to include other areas of copyright dispute, including the application
of anti-circumvention prohibitions to prevent the dissemination of software
code created to evade copy protection codes for films in DVD format).
23. Sheldon w. Halpern, The Digital Threat to the Normative Role of
Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 569, 595 (2001).

24. MaCaulay, supra note 10, at 21 (opposing a bill which would have
extended the duration of copyright protections).
25. Id. at 23.
See also Breyer, supra note 10; infra note 58 and
accompanying text.
26. PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 144.

27. Id. at 143. Such "chaos" of course was not the sole reason for the final
enactment of a statute, which, contrary to previous practice, recognized that

authors, and not only publishers, had a protectable interest in their works. Id.
at 143-144. See, e.g., MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF
COPYRIGHT (1993) (stating that the final enactment of the Statute of Anne was
the result of political battles between anti-censorship, anti-monopoly, pro-

author and pro-publisher forces).
28. PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 143. In reality the Statute of Anne was a

partial re-establishment of publisher's rights, since the statute also granted
rights to printers to bring actions against pirated works. Id. at 144. See, e.g.,
Id.; KAPLAN, supra note 21 (suggesting that publishers rather than authors

were the intended beneficiaries of England's first copyright statute).
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saw the eradication of printer's regulations. 9 The ultimate result
of this deregulation was the collapse of the French publishing
industry. In her seminal work, Publishingand CulturalPolitics in
Revolutionary Paris 1789 - 1810, Carla Hesse documents the
impact on the French printing industry of the elimination of
protection for their distribution efforts. Instead of creating a
"cultural world in which public exchange of ideas would be an
authorless and classless form of social action"30 commercial
presses, freed of old regime restraints, poured forth ephemera,
romance novels and pirated copies of previously published works.
As profits plummeted, production of public domain texts became
commercially unviable: "[t]exts in the public domain had become
'too free' to be spread through the mechanism of the commercial
market."3'
The arguments against censorship and undue restrictions on
public dissemination of copyrighted works represented by these
two historic developments have strong analogues in today's
debates over the extension of copyright protection to the Internet."
Challenges to intellectual property protection on the basis of
its adverse impact on technological development also have
historical analogues. Debates over the potentially deleterious
effect of patent and copyright protection on the nascent motion
picture industry marked its development at the turn of the
twentieth century. Patents granted to Thomas Edison for his new
motion picture camera gave rise to "patent wars" between
competing movie studios over the right to use the new motion
picture technologies." These patent wars were as hard fought and
29. HESSE, supra note 2, at 241. See also Kerever, supra note 12 (noting

that the droit d'auteur of the French Revolution was "inspired by legal and
economic considerations"); Ginsburg, supra note 21 (arguing that the French
revolutionary legislature viewed copyright law as a way to advance public
learning).
30. HESSE, supra note 2, at 242.

31. Id. at 243. This lack of commercial viability resulted in large part from
the inability of printers to earn any income from the distribution of texts that
were available for anyone to print. Id. It raises interesting questions
regarding present claims for a broadened public domain and the value of

ownership-less works on the Internet.
32. I am currently continuing to research the analogues between the
experiences of the French Revolution and today's Internet "revolution" since I
believe useful insights into the challenges and potential solutions that face our
new efforts at freeing creative expression from the "shackles" of analog and

print media may be obtained.
33. For an outstanding historical analysis of the various patent battles that
occurred over early motion picture technologies, including Edison's own

travails in obtaining patent protection for his kinetoscope, see EILEEN
BOWSER, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CINEMA 1907-1915 (History of American

Cinema, vol. 2, Charles Harpole ed.) (1990); RICHARD KOSZARsKI, AN
EVENING'S ENTERTAINMENT: THE AGE OF THE SILENT FEATURE PICTURE 1915-

1928 (History of American Cinema, vol. 3, Charles Harpole ed.) (1990);
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fiercely debated as business methods patents on the Internet
today. Companies raced to the Patent Office to tie up their
technological advances, leading to countless legal challenges.'
Such patent wars were not limited to the United States, but
extended to Europe and the nascent film industries in Great
Britain, France and Germany. 5
Despite claims that this
technological protection threatened to stifle, if not permanently
harm, the United States film industry, this industry constitutes
over 5% of the gross domestic product today, amounting to $457
billion in 2000.36
If. DOOMED TO REPEAT HISTORY?
Hostility to intellectual property protection is not a new
development. To the contrary, early efforts to develop a federal
trademark law in the 1870's were met with judicial hostility. A
strongly worded Supreme Court decision treated trademarks as
poor, unimaginative stepchildren to their more "creative"
relatives-patents and copyrights.37 In words that must make
those who create trademarks for new products and services cringe,
the Court described trademarks as "the result of accident rather
than design"' and "require[ing] no fancy or imagination, no
genius, no laborious thought."9
More recently in the 1980's,
CHARLES MUSSER, THE EMERGENCE OF CINEMA: THE AMERICAN SCREEN TO
1907 (History of American Cinema, vol. 1, Charles Harpole ed.) (1990).
34. See sources cited supra note 33. These challenges were not limited to
validity and patent interference proceedings but also included patent and
copyright infringement challenges. Moreover, the problems faced by Edison's
new technology were not limited to questions of patentability but also
extended to the problem of whether the new creation of a motion picture was
subject to copyright protection, and if so, what form any deposit should take
for this new creation.
35. See sources cited supra note 33.
36. Jack Valenti, COPYRIGHT & CREATIVITY - The Jewel in America's
Trade Crown, Address Before the Int'l Trademark Ass'n (Jan. 22, 2001),
available at http://www.mpaa.org/jack/2001/01_01_22b.htm.
37. The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
38. Id.
39. Id.
In rejecting the claim that Congress's power to enact the 1870
Trademark Act could be supported by the Patents and Copyrights Clause, see
supra note 7, the Supreme Court stressed the lack of creativity in the
development of trademarks. Id. The Court stated:
Any attempt, however, to identify the essential characteristics of a
trade-mark with inventions and discoveries in the arts and sciences, or
with the writings of authors, will show that the effort is surrounded
with insurmountable difficulties.
The ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention or
discovery. The trade-mark recognized by the common law is generally
the growth of a considerable period of use, rather than a sudden
invention. It is often the result of accident rather than design, and
when under the act of Congress it is sought to establish it by
registration, neither originality, invention, discovery, science, nor art is
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United States courts demonstrated hostility to the perceived
monopolistic nature of copyrights and patents in a series of
decisions that questioned the pro-competitive nature of such
grants. 40
Present developments suggest that we have once again
entered into a period of hostility to intellectual property
protection. This hostility is not limited to those who seek to turn
the Internet into a copyright-free zone on the unsupported basis
that the free dissemination of "information" requires such
freedom." To the contrary, recent trends to re-establish longdiscredited doctrines threaten to undermine the balance struck by
intellectual property laws between creators' rights and public
access, and demonstrate hostility to the pro-competitive goals of

in any way essential to the right conferred by that act. If we should
endeavor to classify it under the head of writings of authors, the
objections are equally strong. In this, as in regard to inventions,
originality is required. And while the word writings may be liberally
construed, as it has been, to include original designs for engravings,
prints, &c., it is only such as are original, and are founded in the
creative powers of the mind. The writings which are to be protected are
the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, prints,
engravings and the like. The trade-mark may be, and generally is, the
adoption of something already in existence as the distinctive symbol of
the party using it ... It requires no fancy or imagination, no genius, no
laborious thought. It is simply founded on priority of appropriation ....
[Wie are unable to see any such power in the constitutional provision
concerning authors and inventors, and their writings and discoveries.
Id.
40. See, e.g., Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir.
1984) (citing cases which refer to the government's grant of a patent or
copyright as a monopoly that gives rise to presumptions of economic and
market power that may warrant a per se prohibition). See also Comm'r Shelia
F. Anthony, Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law: From Adversaries to
Partners, 28 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 1, 5 (2000) (noting the
government's "Nine No-Nos" listing the types of licensing activities, including
grant backs and cross licensing of patents that could lead to antitrust liability
for such activities). Cf. Miller Instituform, Inc. v. Instituform of N. Am., Inc.,
830 F.2d 606, 608-609 (6th Cir. 1987) (describing various ways in which a
patent holder might violate the antitrust laws). The courts' hostility to the
monopolistic nature of patent and copyright grants was alleviated somewhat
by the First Circuit's decision in Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support
Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994). The court rejected the view that
ownership of a copyright could be considered a grant of monopoly power
sufficient in itself to raise antitrust concerns over marketing arrangements.
Id. at 1187. The "Nine No-No's" policy was alleviated by the issuance of new
Merger and Licensing Guidelines by the Department of Justice in the early
1990's.
41. An indefensible position, in my view, since it fails to distinguish
between information (or facts) that falls outside the strictures of copyright
protection and "expression" protected under copyright law. The popularity of
web sites such as Napster has little to do with the spread of "information" and
everything to do with the illegal reproduction of popular artistic expression.
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intellectual property protection.
These trends appear to be based on the assumption that
reductions in intellectual property protection serve public welfare
needs for free or inexpensive access to IP-protected works.
Whether dressed in the guise of arguments regarding the "common
heritage of mankind,"42 economic need based on lower standards of
living,43 the "bad bargain" of international negotiations,"
"information wants to be free,"45 or the right to personal use of any
IP-based work "because it's there," 6 these challenges seek to

42. See, e.g., Doris E. Long, Copyright and the Uruguay Round Agreements:
A New Era of Protection or An Illusory Promise?, 22 AM. INTELL. PROP. L.
ASS'N Q.J. 531 (1994) (noting that these arguments are most often raised in
international settings and are based on the view that certain intellectual
property, most often those related to technology or scientific inventions,
qualifies as a common heritage of mankind for which no protection should be
allowed).
43. This argument is most often raised in international settings. The
argument is based on the premise that intellectual property rights most often
result in the request for some type of payment ("rent") before the right can be
used. Given the lower standard of living in many developing and least
developed nations, this rent cost imposes an unequal burden on such
countries. Since pirated products are invariably cheaper than the legitimate
product, the lower standard of living excuses the use of pirated products
because cost differentials provide no realistic ability to purchase legitimate
products. Although this argument was most often raised with regard to
technological and scientific works, including for example, access to low cost
pirated drugs, some use the argument to justify the purchase of all categories
of pirated goods, including pirated copies of motion pictures and sound
recordings.
44. The perceived unequal bargaining powers of the various nations that
participated in the Uruguay Round Negotiations, which ultimately resulted in
the TRIPS agreement, serves as the basis of the "bad bargain" argument. See,
e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and
Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613 (1996) (raising the argument
that the strong protection for intellectual property rights under TRIPS should
be reduced because they represent an unfair agreement between developed
and developing countries).
45. Id. at 625. This phrase is used to justify a wide array of copyright
infringing activity using the Internet on the grounds that controls over content
are contrary to the information sharing purposes of the Internet. This
argument is often raised in domestic debates over the scope of protection to be
afforded copyrighted works on the Internet.
46. The most recent example of this argument appears to be the arguments
based on the unauthorized reproduction and distribution via the Internet of
copyright-protected sound recordings. Many people justified their use of
Napster on the grounds that since music companies "rip off" the artist by
providing inadequate compensation for the musician's work, it is acceptable to
"rip off" the music companies. Of course, the fact that the artist loses twice
(being "ripped off" by both the music company and her purported fans) does
not seem to be part of the equation. The additional rationale that such
unauthorized copying does not really harm the artist because they earn most
of their income from concerts sounds reminiscent of the arguments used
during the 19th century to justify the unauthorized publication of works in the
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reduce present levels of protection for intellectual property.
Certainly, absolute protection of intellectual property rights,
with no recognized exceptions for "fair" or compulsory uses, 47 is no
more acceptable than reducing protection to levels that destroy the
economic incentives represented by current protection regimes.'
The history of intellectual property protection is replete with
efforts by lawmakers, courts and international organizations to
strike an acceptable balance between protection and free access
based on perceived societal needs.49 Clearly no bright line rule is
possible. 50 The potentially disastrous impact that errors on the

United States of the novels of Charles Dickens and other foreign authors.
Like modern day musicians, foreign authors could always recoup their lost
earnings through readings, such as Dickens undertook in America. The
adequacy of this option is probably most clearly answered by Victor Hugo, who
chaired the First Author's Union. The union's activities eventually led to the
adoption of the Berne Convention and the first multinational treaty regime
establishing international protection for copyright.
47. I used the traditional term of "fair use" as codified in Section 107 of the
U.S. copyright law and expressed more broadly in Article 13 of TRIPS. See,
e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2001) (listing factors to consider in determining fair use);
TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 13, 33 I.L.M. at 88 (establishing a right that is
contrary to the general requirement of compensation for use of a copyrighted
work but which is limited in its applications to those uses which are perceived
to be of social utility). I do not mean to suggest by this comparison that TRIPS
and U.S. fair use doctrines are necessarily co-extensive, merely that the two
aim to reach the same types of socially useful uncompensated uses.
48. The philosophical basis for intellectual property protection under
domestic regimes may vary from Lockean labor reward theories, to natural
rights, to property rights, to personality protection. At the international level,
however, TRIPS plainly established that its intellectual property protection
regime was based strictly on the utilitarian (trade) value of intellectual
property law. First and foremost, TRIPS was a trade agreement, negotiated
under the auspices of GATT, a trade organization. More significantly, even
the language of TRIPS emphasizes the utilitarian nature of the protection at
issue. In the preamble, TRIPS stresses that the protections contained in the
Agreement were designed "to reduce distortions and impediments to
international trade ...and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce
intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate
trade.... " TRIPS, supra note 6, Preamble, 33 I.L.M. at 84.
49. The Berne Convention's Protocol Regarding Developing Countries
represents such an accommodation between copyright owners and the public.
It grants developing countries the right to certain uncompensated uses of
copyrighted works, including the right of translation and dissemination where
works are not available in native language editions. See, e.g., Berne
Convention, supra note 6, art. 21, 828 U.N.T.S. at 253, 281 (incorporating by
reference the "Protocol Regarding Developing Countries").
Such
accommodations are also apparent in domestic fair use and fair dealing
exceptions to copyright protection. See infra notes 79-96 and accompanying
text.
50. Even attempts to examine the economic viability of copyright protection
recognized that optimal economic operation of a protection system requires
some degree of unprotected use, but not where that line should be drawn with
any degree of precision.
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side of free access can have on today's global economy, however,
mandates that any reduction be applied cautiously.
As the world discovered in 1994, when the disastrous reevaluation of the Thai Baht led to severe financial crises
throughout Asia, modem globalization connected world economies
in ways previously unseen. This interconnectedness is not limited
to economic matters. To the contrary, countries rapidly adopt the
changes made another country or region in order to match the
breadth of intellectual property rights protection. Such adoptions
are even more likely where the change in protection provides a
competitive advantage.
In 1993, the European Union ("E.U.") extended the term of
copyright protection beyond the traditional life plus fifty year
period established under the Berne Convention51 to life plus
seventy years." United States lawmakers rapidly followed suit on3
the grounds that such protection was a competitive necessity.
Other than a concern over E.U. authors somehow achieving
greater protection than United States authors, it is difficult to see
how an extra twenty years of protection after the author's death
incentivizes creation. In the absence of such incentivization, the
harm to the public domain by removing these works for additional
periods of time seems unjustified. Yet, the "me too" syndrome of
globalization continues to push countries to adopt similar
standards of protection, even where such protection has a
questionable competitive impact. Thus, even though there was
criticism of the extension of United States patent protection to
business methods on the Internet, the European and Japanese
Patent Offices thereafter began to recognize and grant such
patents.5 Admittedly, the basis for such European and Japanese

51. Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 7, 828 U.N.T.S. at 235.
52. Council Directive 93/98 of 29 October 1993 Harmonizing the Term of
Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, art. 1, 1993 O.J. (L 290).
53. S. REP. No. 104-315, at 5 (1996). See generally J.H. Reichman, An
Evaluation of the Copyright Extension Act of 1995: The Duration of Copyright
and the Limits of Cultural Policy, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 626 (1996)

(criticizing the then-pending legislation to extend copyright protection). Other
than a concern over European Union authors somehow achieving greater
protection than U.S. authors, it is difficult to see how an extra twenty years of

protection after the author's death incentivizes creation. In the absence of
such incentivization, the harm to the public domain by removing these works
for additional periods of time is unjustified.
54. Cf Japanese Patent Law, § 29 (1998) (requiring an invention to have an

industrial application); Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5,
1973, art. 52, 1993 O.J. (L 290) (requiring an invention to be "susceptible" to
industrial applications); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group,
149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (requiring "technological arts" for business

method patent protection to apply). See generally John R. Thomas, The PostIndustrialPatent System, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 3, 58

(1999) (concluding that "the frontiers of the patent system appear virtually
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protection is slightly different, since both countries impose a
technical application requirement on the grant of patents that is
not precisely required under United States law. 5 Nevertheless,
each country apparently felt compelled to extend protection to
such methods, despite initial reluctance.
These examples demonstrate that, in today's interconnected
global economy, once the "genie is out of the bottle" in a single
country, it is virtually impossible to replace it in any country. In
view of the increased global impact of any erroneous decision
regarding the scope of protection to be afforded IPR, recent
decisions by the United States Congress and courts to resurrect
old doctrines such as the "duty of election"56 need to be quickly
reconsidered (and remedied) before these decisions cause
unintended (and unfortunate) consequences on both domestic
innovation and international protection.57
III. INCENTIVIZING CREATIVITY AND WEALTH
PRODUCTION
Much of the current debate over the proper role of intellectual
property protection in a civil society rests on the answer to a
fundamental question: To what extent does intellectual property
protection encourage the creation of innovative works and
inventions? To the extent that intellectual property protection
encourages such creation, it should be supported. Of course, there
is a corollary to this question: To what extent does intellectual
property protection encourage the development of domestic or
export industries, thus fueling economic development?
For
developing and least developed countries, this corollary question
may be even more significant as such countries strive to improve
the standards of living of their citizens through individual and
technological development.
Clearly, intellectual property protection is not a pre-requisite
to the encouragement of all creative acts. Like many others, I
have several unpublished novels hidden in my desk drawer that
were created without thought (or even hope) of monetary reward
or economic exploitation. Consequently, the possibility of
intellectual property protection had little to do with their creation.

without limit").
55. See sources cited supra note 53.
56. See discussion infra Part V.B.

57. See infra note 99. This concern about unintended global consequences
undeniably applies to decisions that improperly extend the scope of protection
as well as those which improperly limit such protections. Nevertheless, given

the already heightened global hostility to IPR generally, errors on the side of
less protection seem to create a more immediate problem since they provide a

ready excuse for pirates who already seek to diminish the rights of intellectual
property owners for free rider purposes.
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As Mark Rose acknowledged in his work Authors and Owners, the
absence of copyright law and an abundance of plagiarism marked
one of the periods of greatest achievement in English literaturethe Elizabethan Age.58
Similarly, many inventors created their break through
inventions long before patent regimes existed to protect those
inventions. Gunpowder, the printing press and time clocks
developed without the benefit of the economic incentives offered by
present-day intellectual property protection regimes.
These
examples demonstrate that the economic exploitation guarantees
contained in present intellectual property regimes are not required
to encourage all innovation. The image of the starving artist in
the garret, or the mad scientist in the basement remain powerful
images, and to a certain extent retain their validity as emblems of
creative endeavors. Nevertheless, entire categories of innovative
works and products exist that undoubtedly would not have been
created without the economic incentives provided by intellectual
property laws, 9 especially those works and products that require
intensive capital investment in their creation, commercialization
or distribution. Medicines, motion pictures, and sophisticated
computer software programs are some of the most obvious
examples of works whose creation is encouraged by strong
intellectual property laws.
According
to
the
Pharmaceutical
Research
and
Manufacturers of America ("Ph.R.M.A."), the average cost of
creating, testing, and marketing a new drug is approximately $500
million."0 "Of every 5,000 medicines tested, on average, only five
are tested in clinical trials and only one" of those actually receives
approval for patient use. 61 Moreover, the average time to bring a
new drug to market, including the time required to establish
58. Among the most well known instances of such unauthorized
"borrowing" being, of course, Shakespeare's liberal use of works by fellow
dramatist Christopher Marlowe and others. KAPLAN, supra note 21; ROSE,
supra note 27. For suggestions that copyright serves little purpose in
encouraging true creativity since everything is derivative, see e.g., Paul
Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 209, 218 (1983); Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 332;
David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
147, 171-73 (1981). Nevertheless, although I agree that ideas and even plot
structures may be derivative, creativity in literary and artistic media is
certainly not limited to these narrow categories.
59. See, e.g., Paul Edward Geller, Copyright History and the Future: What's
Culture Got to Do with It?, 47 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 209 (2000) (recognizing that
creativity alone does not encourage the updating of treatises and other works

which the author labels as "scrivener's" works).
60. Pharm. Research Mfrs. of Am., Why Do Medicines Cost So Much?, at
http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications/brochure/questions/whycostm

uch.phtml (last visited Aug. 17, 2001).
61. Id.
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safety, is approximately twelve to fifteen years.62 Only three out of
ten marketed drugs actually generate enough income to meet or
exceed their average research and development costs.63 Similarly,
the successful creation, beta testing and commercialization of a
computer software program are labor and capital intensive.'
In the early days of cinema, films required little more than a
hand-cranked camera and a few actors on an open-air sound
stage. 5 In contrast, today's movies represent multi-million dollar
investments.
The average major studio film in 1999 cost
approximately $80 million to produce and market.66 The industry
estimates that only one in ten films earns back its investment
through domestic theatrical distribution.67 The music industry is
also extremely labor and capital intensive, with only 15% of
released recordings generating enough revenue to cover their
costs. 6
There is no question that other avenues to secure funding for
medical research or film production outside commercial
exploitation (such as philanthropic institutions) exist. Similarly,
computer programs such as Linux, Gnutella and other open source
programs continue to be developed and perfected. The reality,
however, is that the absence of market incentives for the
perfection of such programs generally delays the creation of viable
versions of computer programs." To the extent that the rapid
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Figures for software development remain notoriously closely guarded,
as do the methods of determining the actual cost of software development.
Nevertheless, the scope of research and the budgets for such research at large
multinational software companies such as Microsoft and Adobe indicate that
the costs equate with those of films and pharmaceuticals companies. See, e.g.,
Press Release, Microsoft Corp., Microsoft Corporation Financial Highlights
First Quarter of Fiscal Year 2001 (Dec. 20, 2000), available at
www.microsoft.com/msft/earnings/FYO1/ql0l-finhighlights.htm (stating that
research expenditures for Microsoft totaled $956 million for the first quarter of
fiscal year 2001.).
65. See, e.g., BOWSER, supra note 33, at xi (tracing the development of film
from a "hand-crafted amusement" to a medium of mass communication).
66. Valenti, supra note 36.
67. Id.
68. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Campaign Against Piracy: Effects, at
http://www.riaa.org(Protect-Campaign-3.cfm (last visited Aug. 17, 2001). The
article further acknowledges that piracy has an exponential impact on
earnings because "[t]he thieves often don't focus on the eighty-five percent
[that don't generate the necessary revenue to recoup costs]; they go straight to
the top and steal the gold." Id.
69. See, e.g., Ben Charny, Gnutella Spreading Itself Thin, ZDNET NEWS,
Jan.
29,
2001,
available
at
http://www.zdnet.com/filters/printerfriendly/0,6061,2679303-2,00.html (stating
that Gnutella, for all its hype, remains a program that is still difficult to use).
Furthermore, it is worth remembering that, although offered without charge,
Napster was developed under corporate auspices for commercial use.
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development of successful programs is a technological benefit
(which I believe it is), we cannot afford to rely solely on whim for
the creation of software to meet our increasing technological
needs. Copyright and patent protection provide the necessary
economic incentives for programmers not only to create the
software, but more importantly, to spend the additional time and
resources debugging these programs.
As a corollary to incentivizing creation, modern intellectual
property laws also assist in advancing a country's economic and
There is no question that strong
commercial development.
international protection for intellectual property rights provides
greater per dollar benefit to those countries with the greatest
number of globally pirated products. Yet, the recipients of the
largest real economic benefit may well be those countries that use
such protection to advance domestic economic growth by exploiting
new opportunities in wealth creation.
Put another way, Madonna may decide to continue recording
music regardless of the number of pirated copies of her latest
release. The loss of royalties to her from piracy may be a fraction
of her real earnings globally, and of relatively little consequence to
her decision to pursue her chosen career. In contrast, piracy may
severely impact an unknown artist, or an artist struggling to earn
a living in a developing country, because the loss of earnings may
constitute a greater percentage of the artist's actual earnings."0
The role of intellectual property protection in encouraging the
growth and development of local industry has been amply
In his well-known work, Intellectual Property
demonstrated.
Policies for the Twenty-First Century: The Japanese Experience
with Wealth Creation, Hisamitsu Arai amply illustrates how
various Japanese companies, such as Honda, Sony, and
Matsushita, used the availability of patent protection to develop
an aggressive research and development program aimed at
creating and exploiting patentable inventions.7 1 This program
ultimately helped Japan to convert from a country notorious for its
poorly manufactured knock-offs of Western technology, to a
country that is now one of the key exporters of technology. As Arai
describes the conversion, Japan evolved from a country that
sought information on other country's patents to one that is now a
patent licensor. Similar examples of the use of copyright

70. My thanks to Roger Lawrence for suggesting this hypothetical. I have
not been able to express it as eloquently and thoroughly as he did in our
discussions. Any errors created by my oversimplification are mine alone.
71. ARM, supra note 10, at 20-24. Arai provided a detailed analysis of the
structure of such a wealth creation program, including the role of patents in

the creation cycle, the use of university research, the scope of protection
required to create a "patent market," and the types of examination and use
needed to assure that patents reach their full potential in creating wealth. Id.
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protection to assist in the development of local culture industries
are apparent in Shahid Alikhan's recent work, Socio-Economic
Benefits of Intellectual Property Protection in Developing
Countries.2 In addition to noteworthy growth in the technology
industry by Malaysia and India who have combined intellectual
property protection with domestic investment in educational and
technological infrastructures, Alikhan's sketches the growth of the
software industry in China, which created more than 60,000 jobs
and generated nearly $220 million in tax payments in 1997. 73
Undoubtedly, the benefits of IPR protection are not evenly
dispersed and the pace of commercialization in a given country
depends on a variety of factors external to intellectual property
protection.74
Thus, the impact on any particular country's
industrial and commercial development depends on its ability to
exploit the benefits obtainable from heightened IPR protection. As
Keith Maskus in his seminal work, Intellectual Property Rights in
the Global Economy, recognized:
[S]tronger IPRs have considerable promise for expanding flows of
trade in technical inputs, FDI, and licensing. These in turn could
expand the direct and indirect transfer of technology to developing
nations. Such gains may not be uniformly available to all
developing countries, of course .... But more advanced developing
nations could well benefit from the new policy regime and its ability
to shorten technological distances between core technology providers
and technology followers .... Technology learning must shift from
uncompensated
imitation of lower-quality
techniques to
compensated acquisition of higher-quality techniques. The source of
information spillovers should move from copying by free riders to
incremental innovation by fair followers.
Part of the wealth creation process facilitated by IPR
protection lies, not merely in the incentivization of innovationthe creation of new works, but also in the incentivization of the
dissemination of those newly created works to the public. Removal
of legal protection for publishers and other disseminators of
copyrighted works has a deleterious impact on the quality and
scope of public dissemination of published works. 6
While
dissemination seems easier today with the advent of selfpublishing on the Internet, similar to the lessons learned during
the French Revolution, elimination of publishing houses through
the elimination of the profit obtainable under strong IPR

72. ALIKHAN, supra note 10.

73. Id. at 65.
74. These factors include, inter alia, infrastructure development, a
standard of living that gives rise to disposable income and the size of the
domestic market for consumer goods.
75. MASKUS, supra note 10, at 236-237.
76. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
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protection may severely impact the public availability of a broad
range of works. Despite the ubiquity of the Internet in the United
States, the reality is that only seven percent of the world's
population had access to the Internet in December 2000."7 For
over 90% of the world's population, public dissemination over the
Internet is not a realistic alternative. Balances between creator
protection and public access must continue to be struck to assure
protection of all avenues of public dissemination, including those
of traditional publishing and media outlets.
IV. STRIKING THE PUBLIC INTEREST BALANCE
Although IPR protection serves the goals of commercialization
and technological advancement, overbroad intellectual property
protection undoubtedly stifles innovation. It is axiomatic that no
"new" work ever existed in the area of copyright. As Zechariah
Chafee recognized years ago: "the world goes ahead because each
of us builds on the work of our predecessors. 'A dwarf standing on
the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the giant himself.'
Progress would be stifled if the author had a complete monopoly of
everything in his book.. ."" Plot lines, sc~nes 6 faire and other
ideas properly remain outside the scope of protection to assure
continued free use of the necessary building blocks of literary,
artistic and musical works. 9 Yet, what is critical to the continued
incentivization of innovation is a firm acknowledgement that the
expressive aspects of a work are not merely derivative. To the
contrary, those elements represent true creativity, entitled to
protection against free-riding derivations.
The balancing act between the rights of authors and the need
of the public for access and use of the author's work is a historic
one. Not long after the enactment of the Statute of Anne, courts in
England recognized an exception they called "fair abridgment" to
the newly granted author's right to protect her works." The

77. Nua.com,

How

Many

http://www.nua.com/surveys/how-many-online/world.html
21, 2001).

Online?,

at

(last visited Sept.

78. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM.
L. REV. 503, 511 (1945).
79. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2001) (excluding from protection under
U.S. copyright law "any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle or discovery"). See also TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 9, 33
I.L.M. at 87 (excluding copyright protection for "ideas, procedures, methods of

operation or mathematical concepts as such"). Admittedly the question of
where to draw the line between protectable expression and unprotectable
ideas or facts is not always easy. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l,
Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), affd by an equally divided court, 516 U.S. 233
(1996) (per curiam) (finding menu command hierarchy found unprotected
under copyright as a method of operation).
80. Gyles v. Wilcox, 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (1740). For a review of early English
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United States later adopted this doctrine in Folsom v. Marsh,"' and
eventually codified it in Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976.82
What is notable about the fair use doctrine and its role in
establishing
a balance
between
author protection and
uncompensated use of a copyrighted work is the absence of
predictable application.
As Justice Leval recognized in his
seminal article on the issue, "[w]hat is most curious about this
doctrine [of fair use] is that neither the decisions that have applied
it for nearly 300 years, nor its eventual statutory formulation,
undertook to define or explain its contours or objectives." 3 In
support of his claim for the lack of predictable standards for
applying fair use exceptions to protection, Justice Leval cited the
checkered path of five significant copyright cases-the Howard
Hughes biography case," the Sony Betamax case,85 the Ford
memoirs case,"' the Salinger biography case,87 and the Elron
Hubble biography case."8 Justice Leval's concern about the lack of
predictability has no less resonance today where such significant
fair use cases as the "Pretty Woman" parody case" and the "Wind
Done Gone" case ° had an equally checkered path, with each court

reaching diametrically opposed decisions on the application of fair

case law, see WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW

6-18 (2d ed. 1995); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1105 (1990).
81. 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
82. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2001). This statute lists four non-exclusive factors for
courts to consider in determining whether a claimed use qualifies as a "fair"
one. Id. These factors are: (1) whether the challenged use is for profit or
commercial purposes, (2) the nature of the work being copied, (3) the extent of
the original being used without permission, and (4) the potential market
impact of the unauthorized use. Id.
83. Leval, supra note 80, at 1105.
84. Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 55
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966) (dealing with the protection
of fact research regarding an unauthorized biography).
85. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429
(C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
(dealing with home taping of broadcast television programs).
86. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 723'F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)
(dealing with the line between historical fact and protected expression in
connection with President Ford's memoirs concerning the Nixon pardon).
87. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
rev'd, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (dealing with the right of first publication).
88. New Era Publ'ns Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y.
1988), aff'd on other grounds, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989) (dealing with the use
of copyrighted materials in biographies).
89. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn.
1991), rev'd, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
90. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga.
2001), vacated, 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (dealing with the
publication of a parody based on the copyrighted work Gone with the Wind).
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use standards.
This continued lack of predictability in the application of fair
use standards has been exacerbated in recent years by the
increasing
protection
sought
for
commercially
based,
uncompensated "fair uses" under the guise of public welfare or free
speech needs. The current debate over the application of copyright
laws to Napster, MP3.com, and other unauthorized digital
distribution systems, appears to go beyond traditional areas of fair
use. These traditional areas - criticism, education and news
reporting among others - at least balanced the protection of
authors' rights against the perceived social benefits obtained by
allowing uncompensated uses to further socially useful interests.9'
Modern claims for exemptions based on the right to distribute
copyrighted works over the Internet, by contrast, appear to reside
in the very nature of digital distribution. It is almost as if the
technological ability to do an act (e.g., download music) must
immediately give rise to the legal right to do the act.
Napster justified its offering of software, which allowed peerto-peer transfer of sound recordings and an indexing system which
facilitated such transfers, on the grounds of its users' personal use
and space shifting rights.92 Similarly, MP3.com attempted to
justify its unauthorized reproduction of thousands of copyrighted
sound recordings on the grounds of its users' fair use right to space
shift songs from the CD to their computer or other portable hard
drive
Courts, to date, have resisted the logic of these arguments in
denying relief to Napster 9' and MP3.com9" because of their
unauthorized use of another's copyrighted works. Nevertheless,
the application of the fair use doctrine to other examples of
commercial appropriation remains problematic.
Thus, for

91. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2001) (listing criticism, news reporting and
education as examples of fair use); Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 10,
828 U.N.T.S. at 239 (listing quotations and teaching as examples of fair use).
92. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001).
93. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350-351

(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
94. In A&M Records, the Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court's injunction
against Napster's continued support for the unauthorized distribution of
copyrighted sound recordings. A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1029. Rejecting
Napster's claims that its activities, including providing the software used to
facilitate peer-to-peer distribution and an indexing system qualified as fair
uses, the Ninth Circuit analogized Napster's role to that of an operator of a
flea market whose actions facilitate the sale of pirated goods. Id. at 1023.
95. In UMG Recordings, the court similarly rejected MP3.com's efforts to

wrap its activities the alleged right of CD owners "space shift" their works
onto computer hard drives. UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 352-53. The

court properly recognized that MP3.com failed to take the necessary
precautions (including assuring ownership of the "space shifted" works) to
take advantage of any such fair use. Id. at 352-53.

The John Marshall Law Review

[34:851

example, in an opinion that is notable for its brevity and lack of
discussion of precedent, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
recently overturned an injunction prohibiting the distribution of a
purported parody of Margaret Mitchell's Gone with the Wind.96
The issues addressed by the lower court included such critical
questions as the scope of allowable transformative use in parodies,
derivative works based on characters, market impact in fair use
analysis and the relationship between the First Amendment,
copyright and the public interest. 97 Yet, the appellate court simply
reversed the grant of the injunction with the terse explanation
that such injunction qualified as a "prior restraint under the First
Amendment."98 On its face, this decision has the potential for
eliminating injunctive relief in future copyright cases whenever
the defendant raises a colorable fair use defense. Such tilt in the
delicate balance between author protection and uncompensated
public use could have untold consequences for intellectual property
incentivization in the future.99
The courts' growing hostility toward intellectual property
protection, however, is not limited to what appears to be a
continued lack of predictability in the application of the fair use
doctrine. To the contrary, the courts and Congress have taken
other steps, which may ultimately have the effect of critically
undermining intellectual property rights at a time when such
errors may not be readily correctable. 1°
'

96.
97.
98.
99.

Suntrust Bank, 252 F.3d 1165.
Id.
Id.
It may also have an adverse impact on future international protection of

copyright since the ability to obtain such injunctive relief in copyright cases is
a treaty obligation under Article 50 of TRIPS. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 6,
art. 50, 33 I.L.M. at 102 (requiring the availability of provisional measures,
including preliminary injunctive relief, in infringement cases).
100. I do not mean to suggest that all current developments in U.S.

intellectual property laws aim to reduce protection. To the contrary, in what I
believe is a mistaken move to follow a wrong-headed decision of the E.U., the

U.S. extended copyright protection for an additional twenty years beyond the
then-existing life plus fifty years. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
Despite the ill-advised nature of the extension, globalization appears to
guarantee that perceived extensions in protection, regardless of their merit,

will be followed, even where such protection threatens incentivization or
public welfare interests. For the same reason, protection against the use of
anti-circumvention devices should be applied cautiously. While an owner has
the right to "lock" up his goods against "burglary," he does not have the right

to use "burglary tools" to prohibit all access to a copyrighted work. Thus, for
example, where a work only exists in digital format protected by copy codes, or
where the lack of access to a digital version of a work makes access for
purposes of scholarship, criticism or education excessively costly or difficult,
anti-circumvention prohibitions should not apply.
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V. YALE RESURRECTED
At the height of intellectual property protection in the United
States in the 1980's, intellectual property owners had the luxury of
protecting their creations in as broad a manner as possible.
Inventors could seek patent protection for their inventions while
maintaining their right to protect these inventions under trade
secret law during the application process. At least until the patent
issued, a patent application was confidential. 01 ' If the patent did
not issue, the inventor could still seek to protect her invention
under trade secret doctrines since she had not made any public
disclosure of her invention sufficient to eliminate such protection.
In a similar vein, computer code for which copyright
registration was sought could retain its trade secret nature despite
the requirement of the filing of a publicly available copy of the
code in question. 2°
Copyright Office regulations allowed the
submission of such computer code under special masking
requirements designed to protect the confidentiality of the
submitted code.'0 3 These requirements allowed the submission of
the first and last twenty-five pages of the code in question."
Portions of this deposit could be masked so long as sufficient
expression was disclosed in the deposit to allow for identification
of the code in question.""
The efficiency of this masking
requirement depended on the amount of code that was to be
registered.
The longer the code the more likely the critical
elements could be masked.
Courts also readily acknowledged that copyrighted characters
and works could possess trademark significance that survived
their loss of protection on expiration of the copyright protection
term. As the court in Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales, Inc.
recognized:
Dual protection under copyright and trademark laws is particularly
appropriate for graphic representations of characters. A character
deemed an artistic creation deserving copyright protection, may also
serve to identify the creator, thus meriting protection under theories

101. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (4th ed., rev. 9 Sept. 1982). See also 35

U.S.C. § 122 (2001) (requiring the Patent and Trademark Office to keep
applications in confidence).
102. Subject matter jurisdiction required registration with the Copyright
Office. Thus, before enforcing his rights in court, a copyright owner had to
register the software code. Subsequent amendments eliminated this pre-

registration requirement for foreign authors, but maintained the requirement
for U.S. authors. 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2001).
103. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20 (2001).

104. Id.
105. Id.
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106
of trademark or unfair competition.

The right to such dual protection was premised on a clear
acknowledgement that each arena of intellectual property law
served its own special goals, and on the incongruity of limiting
protection to works that were more creative. The court stressed:
[T]he rule urged by defendant that copyrightable book covers may
not obtain trademark or unfair competition protection would permit
incongruous results: a book cover lacking sufficient originality to
warrant copyright protection could be protected for a potentially
unlimited duration under the trademark laws, while covers
revealing great artistry or ingenuity would be limited to the
duration of the copyright. 107
Even patents and trademarks retained an uneasy alliance in
the area of trade dress protection. Thus, for example, in Sunbeam
Products, Inc. v. West Bend Co.,10 8 the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected efforts to automatically limit trade dress
protection in the face of the potential for protection under patent
law. It stated:
The Lanham Act embodies two strong countervailing policies:
protection of the proprietary interest in distinctive trademarks,
minimizing consumer confusion and maximizing consumer
confidence, versus fostering competition and its attendant economic
benefits. Trademark law accommodates these countervailing public
policies by limiting trademark protection to distinctive, nonfunctional marks.
In the instant case, therefore, the public interest calculus is
subsumed within the merits of the trade dress infringement claim:
Because the product configuration of the American Classic
Mixmaster (R) is entitled to trade dress protection, it necessarily
follows that the preliminary injunction serves the public interest.
Indeed, trade dress protection of the American Classic Mixmaster
(R) will not frustrate competition, but will foster it.'09
Although the demarcation between the various forms of
intellectual property protection is not always clear delineated,"0
106. Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 11961197 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 1197-98.

108. 123 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1997). See also Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan
Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc) (stating that the
existence of a patent does not preclude trade dress protection); Thomas &
Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 290 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that
an expired patent does not preclude trademark protection); But cf. Vornado
Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1500 (10th Cir.
1995) (denying trade dress protection where a product configuration is "a
significant inventive component of an invention covered by a utility patent").
109. 123 F.3d 246, 260 (5th Cir. 1997).
110. Distinctions between trade dress, and design and utility patents proved
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the principle of dual protection (or, more precisely, the absence of
an obligation to elect between diverse forms of protection) seems
well established. Recent decisions, however, demonstrate that
United States law is rapidly rejecting non-election. Instead, it
appears that the former discredited doctrine of election is raising
its head, with all the resultant harm to the incentivizing purposes
of IPR protection that had been rejected nearly thirty years ago.
A. The Obligationof Election
In the opening decades of the 20th Century, United States
courts crafted a doctrine of election that required intellectual
property owners to limit protection for their creative efforts to a
single form of protection."' In one of the earliest cases to establish
the doctrine, Louis De Jonge & Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co.,112 the
Circuit Court of Pennsylvania insisted that the plaintiff could not
protect its painting which had been used as covers for boxes under
both copyright and design patent protection because such dual
protection would lead to inconsistent protection. The court stated:
In the present instance the artist was commissioned to produce a
design for the useful arts; in executing the commission, he produced
a painting of artistic excellence, original and pleasing, merely

regarded by itself as a picture, and also original and ornamental as
a design; and with such a work in his possession the owner or

author might treat and protect it in either of its aspects. Since it
was qualified for admission into the two statutory classes, I see no
reason why it might not be placed in either. But it could not enter
both. The method of procedure, the term of protection, and the
penalties for infringement, are so different that the author or owner
of a painting that is eligible for both classes must decide to which
region of intellectual effort the work is to be assigned, and he must
abide by the decision. 113

particularly perplexing. Unlike copyrights and trademarks, where expiration
of copyright protection did not adversely affect trademark protection for the
same protected graphic work, see Frederick Warne, 481 F. Supp. at 1196,
courts were conflicted over whether the expiration of patent protection
precluded trademark protection for the same invention. The majority trend
appeared to reject absolute preclusion in favor of a factual analysis of the
relationship between the patent at issue and the purportedly functional
elements of the claimed trade dress. See cases cited supra note 108 and
accompanying text.
111. See generally Michael J. Kline, Requiring an Election of Protection for
Patentable/Copyrightable Computer Programs (Part 1), 67 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 280 (1985) (suggesting that an election should be
made upon the issuance of a patent); Douglas R. Wolf, The Doctrine of
Elections: Has the Need to Choose Been Lost?, 9 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
439 (1991) (considering the election doctrine and its application by the
Copyright Office).
112. 182 F. 150 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1910), affd, 235 U.S. 33 (1914).
113. Id. at 151-52.
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Subsequent courts amplified the application of the election
doctrine by placing the obligation squarely within the parameters
of a constitutional imperative. Thus, in Taylor Instrument Co. v.
Fawley-Brost Co.,114 the court rejected plaintiffs claim for
copyright protection for charts used as part of a temperaturerecording device1 1 5 because the plaintiff failed to select patent (as
opposed to copyright) protection for its plainly useful work." 6 The
court held that its decision to apply the obligation of election was
mandated by the Copyrights and Patents clause:
Art. 1, Sec. 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution of the United States
empowers Congress "To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." In the
exercise of the power thus conferred, Congress has legislated with
reference to copyrights (Title 17 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.), thereby
furnishing protection to "Authors" in their "Writings," and has
legislated with reference to patents (Title 35 U.S.C.A. § 31 et seq.),
thereby furnishing protection to "Inventors" in their "Discoveries."
Thus it appears that Congress has provided two separate and
distinct fields of protection, the copyright and the patent. In the
former (Sec. 4), it has placed "all the writings of an author," and in
the latter (Sec. 31), inventions and discoveries of "any new and
useful art, machine, manufacture *** or any new and useful
improvements thereof *** ." While it may be difficult to determine

in which field protection must be sought, it is plain, so we think,
that it must be in one or the other; it cannot be found in both. In
other words, there is no overlapping territory, even though the line
of separation 1 1may
in some instances be difficult of exact
7
ascertainment.

114. 139 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1943).
115. Taylor, 139 F.2d at 99. The temperature-recording device at issue was
composed of a thermometer, a clock and writing device that marked the
changing temperature on the charts that were the subject of the plaintiffs
copyright claim. Id.
116. Id. at 101. In reaching this conclusion the court relied heavily upon
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), and the distinction Baker made between
copyright protectable "explanation" of the art of accounting and the
unprotected practice of that art. Taylor, 139 F.2d at 99-101. The Supreme
Court in Baker described the distinction as follows:
The description of the art in a book, though entitled to the benefit of
copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself. The
object of the one is explanation; the object of the other is use. The
former may be secured by copyright. The latter can only be secured, if it
can be secured at all, by letters-patent.
Taylor, 139 F.2d at 99-100 (quoting Baker, 101 U.S. at 105). This distinction
did not require election, however, since the difference between expression and
invention ("practice") is a difference in the scope of protection, which inheres
in the nature of copyright and patent protection, respectively.
117. Taylor, 139 F.2d at 99. The citation in the quotation to copyrights,
referred to the Copyright Act of 1909.
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In 1954, in Mazer v. Stein, the Supreme Court, faced with a
claim for copyright registration of a lamp design, declined to
address the continuing validity of the obligation of election since
8
the plaintiff had not sought design protection for its lamp stand.""
Nevertheless, the Court implied that election was not required,
stating: "[w]e do hold that the patentability of the statuettes, fitted
as lamps or unfitted, does not bar copyright as works of art.
Neither the Copyright Statute nor any other says that because a
thing is patentable it may not be copyrighted. We should not so
hold." 119
This implied rejection later became actual when the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals in In re Yardley' 20 cited the Mazer
decision to support its direct repudiation of the doctrine of election.
In an appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
Office's ("P.T.O") refusal to grant a design patent for a watch face
featuring a caricature of Spiro Agnew, that had already been
copyrighted, the Circuit Court of Pennsylvania rejected the
obligation of election as grounds for such refusal:
We believe that the "election of protection" doctrine is in direct
conflict with the clear intent of Congress .... The Congress has
provided that subject matter of the type involved in this appeal is
"statutory subject matter" under the copyright statute and is
"statutory subject matter" under the design patent statute, but the
Congress has not provided that an author-inventor must elect
between securing a copyright or securing a design patent. Therefore,
we conclude that it would be contrary to the intent of Congress to
hold that an author-inventor must elect between the two available
modes of securing exclusive rights.121
In addition to rejecting the doctrine of election as contrary to
Congressional intent, the court in Yardley also rejected the basis
for the election doctrine, holding: "[w]e do not think that the
If
[Copyrights and Patents Clause] requires an election ....
anything, the concurrent availability of both modes of securing
exclusive rights aids in achieving the stated purpose of the
constitutional provision."122
B. The Re-emergence of Election
Despite what appeared to be an end to the doctrine of election
in In re Yardley, 23 recent legislative enactments and court
118. 347 U.S. 201, 216-17 (1954).
119. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217.
120. 493 F.2d 1389, 1391 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
121. Yardley, 493 F.2d at 1394.
122. Id. at 1395-96.
123. But cf. Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against
Copyright Protectionfor Computer Programsin Machine-ReadableForm, 1984
DuKE L.J. 663 (1984) (suggesting that the rejection of election in Yardley was
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decisions indicate that the doctrine may be gaining renewed vigor,
albeit in a somewhat different guise. Like the infamous "Nine
Patent No-No's" of the Department of Justice for patent licenses, 4
these developments seem to auger a renewed hostility to the
incentivizing nature of intellectual property protection.
The right of a patent owner to avoid choosing between patent
and trade secret protection in her initial decision to seek
protection under United States patent laws was eliminated in
1999. Under 35 U.S.C. Section 122(b)(1)(A), virtually all patent
applications must be published within eighteen months of
application." ' Such publication will occur regardless of whether a
decision regarding ultimate patentability has been made by the
P.T.O. This publication should effectively remove any trade secret
protection that might otherwise lie for the as-yet unprotected
invention disclosed in the application. Although the Act allows an
applicant to opt-out of the publication process, such an option is
not realistic because the applicant would, as a result of opting out,
forego any international protection for her invention.126
At least facially, the elimination of trade secret protection for
patent applications was not directed to the re-establishment of the
doctrine of election.
To the contrary, the goal of pre-grant
publication was to eliminate the perceived threat of so-called
submarine patents. 217 The "correction" represented by the Act may
well be the legal equivalent of throwing out the baby with the bath
water. Aside from a few notable exceptions such as Lemuelson's
automobile parts patents, it is not clear that submarine patents
posed so great a threat to the United States patent system.
Moreover, there were other less intrusive options, such as stricter
application of patent claim amendment rules, that might have
resolved the problem.

limited to the narrow question of election between copyright and design
patent).
124. Anthony, supra note 40, at 5.
125. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2001).

126, While it is too soon to tell how many inventors will chose to opt-out of
publication by electing to forego international protection for their invention,
given the increasingly globalized economy, it seems doubtful this option will
prove highly desirable or popular.

127. The term "submarine patents" refers to inventions adopted by industry
in ignorance of the potential claim for patent protection represented by an
inventor's secret patent application. The patent later "rises to the surface"
and "sinks" industry when the inventor requires payment for the industry's
use of the invention. In this example, the secret patent application prevented

the industry from inventing around the invention.
Among the most notorious submarine patents in the United States was

one granted for intermittent windshield wipers. In addition to being secret,
submarine patents also generally resulted from a lengthy patent application
process further dragged out by the applicant so the applicant's claims covered
widely used industry advances.
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Trademarks appear to be the most recent victim of this
unspoken rush to election. Last year, the Supreme Court, in WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc. ,12 strongly hinted that
the election doctrine was far from moribund. As in the election
cases from the last century, the focus of concern was the potential
conflict with patent law doctrines. But unlike many of these
earlier cases, it was not the potential expansion of protection
through dual patent/copyright protection that caused concern, but
dual protection through the stepchild-trademarks.
In Wal-Mart, the Court was faced with the issue of the extent
of protection granted an unregistered trade dress for clothing
At issue was the design of respondent's one-piece
designs. 29'
seersucker children's clothing.'3 ° The sole issue before the Court
was the scope of protection to be afforded a so-called product
In refusing to protect Samara
configuration trade dress. 3'
Brother's trade dress the Court heightened its earlier hostility to
trademark protection for non-traditional marks and made it clear
that such expansions would not be looked upon with favor.1 32 This
hostility was first apparent in the Court's decision in Qualitex'33 in
which the Court reluctantly protected single color marks but only
if such marks had demonstrated secondary meaning.1 3 ' Even if the
color selected for a product had no relationship whatsoever to any
128. 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
129. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 207.
130. Id. at 207-208.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 215.
133. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
134. Id. at 163-64. Secondary meaning requires proof that "in the minds of
the public, the primary significance of a product feature or term is to identify
the source of the product rather than the product itself." Inwood Labs., Inc. v.

Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.ll (1982). Such proof requires evidence
Acquired
that the mark in question has acquired distinctiveness.
distinctiveness is generally demonstrated by evidence of the mark's long use,
sufficient sales of goods bearing the mark, and/or sufficient advertisement of
the mark to demonstrate that the ordinary consumer considers the mark to
indicate that the good at issue is derived from a single, often unknown, source.
See, e.g., Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830
F.2d 1217 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that the "consuming public" decides whether
a mark is successful and applying the Polaroidfactors to determine whether a
mark achieved secondary meaning).
In Qualitex, the plaintiff accused defendant of infringing plaintiffs
single color mark for its dry cleaning press pad. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163.
The single color mark adopted by the trademark owner was a gold-green color
that had no relationship to any quality or characteristic of the product in
question. Id. at 166. Given its relatively unappetizing color, it is fairly
evident that there was no aesthetic reason for selecting the mark. The Court
nevertheless refused to grant protection to such a clearly arbitrarily chosen
mark without evidence of the mark's secondary meaning. Id. at 162. Thus,
the owner needed to demonstrate that the single color mark was distinctive
before the mark gained trademark protection.
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quality or characteristic of the product at issue, even if a
competitor had apparently copied the color for the purpose of
trading off the renown of the color mark owner's fame (facts which
were established in the lower court decision), protection could only
exist if the trademark owner established acquired distinctiveness
for his trade dress.
The practical import of the Court's secondary meaning
requirement in Qualitex was to grant single color marks the
unenviable status of second-class citizenship as source
designators.
If a single color mark can never be inherently
distinctive,'35 then owners adopt such marks at their peril.
Without the potential of automatic protection upon use granted
inherently distinctive marks, any single color mark is free for the
taking by competitors during the unpredictable period when it is
acquiring secondary meaning.3 6
The Court's insistence on
135. Inherently distinctive marks are those marks which are automatically
distinctive (and therefore immediately protectable) by virtue of the nature of
the mark. Among the marks considered inherently distinctive are arbitrary,
fanciful and suggestive marks. See, e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting
World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976) (discussing the four different categories
of trademarks). Such marks are inherently distinctive because they do not
describe any quality or characteristic of the good at issue. Id. at 9-12. A
descriptive mark, in contrast, is protectable only if its owner demonstrates
that the mark acquired distinctiveness through the mark's use. Id. Because
descriptive marks describe a quality or characteristic of the good, they are not
automatically perceived by consumers to serve as a source identifier. Id.
Therefore, descriptive marks require proof of acquired distinctiveness. Id.
136. There is no established period of time during which a mark can be
assured of acquiring secondary meaning, and therefore becoming protectable
against unauthorized uses. But cf 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2001) (authorizing
registration of marks on Principle Register of the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office upon a showing of distinctiveness). Such secondary meaning may be
assumed after five years of a mark's exclusive use. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(0.
While some courts treated intentional use of another's mark as evidence
of secondary meaning (who would use someone else's mark unless they
believed it served a source designating function?), this is not done consistently.
For cases noting that intentional copying was persuasive, if not conclusive,
evidence of secondary meaning, see e.g., Coach Leatherware Co. v. AnnTaylor,
Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 169 (2d Cir. 1991); 20th Century Wear, Inc. v, SanmarkStardust, Inc., 815 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1987). In view of the rejection of the
doctrine of "secondary meaning in the making," any user of a mark that is not
inherently distinctive runs the serious risk of having his mark stolen by a
competitor before the mark achieves the distinctiveness needed to prevent
unauthorized use. See, e.g., Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131,
138-139 (2d Cir. 1992) (rejecting a doctrine of secondary meaning because
existing law may offer some protection and secondary meaning may develop
quickly to preclude pirating). Whenever a mark owner selects a mark that is
descriptive of his product, he runs the risk of losing that mark by
unauthorized adoption by a third party prior to his mark acquiring
distinctiveness. But, for at least word marks, the owner has the option of
choosing a word mark that is inherently distinctive. For single color marks
the Supreme Court removed this opportunity by eliminating any possibility of
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secondary meaning for single color marks is even more difficult to
understand since multi-color marks fall outside the Court's
strictures for secondary meaning. '
The implied hostility of Qualitex to trademark protection
became apparent with the Court's decision in Wal-Mart. Relying
on its development of two classes of trademarks in Qualitex,'I8 the
Court included product configuration trademarks among the
classes of marks that could never qualify for inherent
distinctivness. Because "product design almost invariably serves
purposes other than source identification"'39 thereby rendering
inherent distinctiveness "problematic,"4 ' the Court struck the
balance between the rights of trademark owners and unfettered
It
public (competitor) access on the side of public access.
supported this balance on the basis of the pro-competitive aspects
such unfettered access provided:
Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competition
with regard to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product
design ordinarily serves by a rule of law that facilitates plausible
threats of suit against new entrants based upon alleged inherent
distinctiveness. How easy it is to mount a plausible suit depends, of
course, upon the clarity of the test for inherent distinctiveness, and
where product design is concerned we have little confidence that a
reasonably clear test can be devised.
... [T]he game of allowing suit based upon4 alleged inherent
distinctiveness seems to us not worth the candle.1 1
The Court's concern about protecting new entrants makes
little sense because the issue of inherency is problematic only for
Older marks would conceivably be able to
new marks.
demonstrate sufficient use to meet a secondary meaning standard.
Similarly, the Court's concern about predictability in determining
source designating function rings false in view of its cavalier
treatment of the equally important issue of when a trade dress
adopting an inherently distinctive mark. Moreover, the Court justified this
second-class treatment of color marks on the questionable grounds that no
color mark "automatically tell[s] a customer that [it] refers to a brand."
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162-163 (emphasis in original).
137. Thus, if Qualitex had placed a single blue line down its mattress pad,

the new color combination was conceivably protectable without the need to
establish secondary meaning. Moreover, since marks need not be identical in

order to create a likelihood of confusion, so long as that hypothetical line was
relatively unobtrusive, the absence of a similar line on an infringer's press pad
does not preclude relief.
138. The two classes of marks were those qualifying as inherently distinctive
(such as word marks and packaging marks), and those that could never
achieve inherent distinctiveness (such as single color marks).
139. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 213.

140. Id. at 213.
141. Id. at 213-14.

The John Marshall Law Review

[34:851

qualifies as product configuration. Since package configuration
trade dress can still qualify as inherently distinctive,' the issue of
when a design qualifies as package (as opposed to product)
configuration has a critical impact on the scope of protection
afforded a new mark. While the Court was concerned about the
harm caused by an unpredictable inherency test, harm caused by
an unpredictable test for qualification as product configuration
caused far less concern:
There will indeed be some hard cases at the margin: a classic glass
Coca-Cola bottle, for instance, may constitute packaging for those
consumers who drink the Coke and then discard the bottle, but may
constitute the product itself for those consumers who are bottle
collectors, or part of the product itself for those consumers who buy
Coke in the classic glass bottle ....We believe, however, that the
frequency and the difficulty of having to distinguish between
product design and product packaging will be much less than the
frequency and the difficulty of4 3 having to decide when a product
design is inherently distinctive.
To emphasize its support for public (competitor) access over
the rights of trademark owners, the Court concluded by suggesting
that in close cases "courts should err on the side of caution and
classify ambiguous trade dress as product design, thereby
requiring secondary meaning.4
I am less sanguine than the Court about the relative paucity
of close cases that may result from their decision. The Court in
Wal-Mart suggested in dicta that restaurant d~cor, the subject of
the first Supreme Court case that established trade dress as a
fully protectable trademark under United States law, 45 might
qualify as "either product packaging ...or else some tertium quid
that is akin to product packaging. " 146
This test is far from
comforting. Apparently, there are now three categories of trade
dress protection: (1) product configuration for which secondary
meaning is required, (2) package configuration for which inherent
distinctiveness might exist, and (3) a new category of trade dress
referred to as "tertium quid" for which no test for application has
been given, but for which inherent distinctiveness might exist. If
the Supreme Court cannot decide what qualifies as product
configuration, how can its new test of non-inherency be applied

142. Id. at 215. See also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,
776 (1992) (holding that the Lanham Act did not require evidence of secondary
meaning for a Mexican restaurant's d~cor because the d~cor was inherently
distinctive).
143. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 215.
144. Id.
145. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 763-67 (providing that the dcor of a Mexican
restaurant qualified as a protectable mark under the Lanham Act).
146. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 215.
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with any degree of predictability?
Perhaps most troubling of all is the Court's hostility to the
consumer protection role of trademarks. With the exception of the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act,'47 trademarks are only protected
to the extent that their unauthorized use causes confusion in the
It is difficult to understand how competition is
marketplace.'
harmed if relief for any claim of trademark infringement can only
be obtained on proof of both distinctiveness and likelihood of
public confusion regarding the source or association of the product
at issue. The claim of competitive harm is further weakened by
the fact that a simple claim of inherent distinctiveness is not
sufficient to support a claim for trade dress protection. To the
contrary, a trade dress owner must also demonstrate that his
Thus, concerns over access by
mark is not functional. 49
competitors to "utilitarian and esthetic" aspects of product
configuration are already greatly alleviated through the
functionality proof burdens placed on trade dress owners."'
The hostility to trademark owners demonstrated by the Court
in Wal-Mart was ameliorated somewhat by the Court's decision
this year in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.;"'

however, once again the hint of election hid behind the Court's
analysis. In TrafFix, the plaintiff sought trade dress protection for
its dual spring traffic sign design." 2 The design at issue was the

147. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2001). Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
("F.T.D.A."), "famous and distinctive" marks receive protection against
diluting uses, regardless of whether the diluting use creates a likelihood of
confusion. Id. This is the only example of trademark protection that removes
"likelihood of confusion" from the balance in deciding whether to grant
protection. The uniqueness of this removal may explain why the protection of
marks under the F.T.D.A. led to so many conflicting choices.
148. The sine qua non of trademark protection is the likelihood of confusion
that arises from the unauthorized use of another's distinctive mark. See, e.g.,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1116(a), 1125(a)(1)(A) (2001) (requiring a finding that there is
"likelihood of confusion" before making injunctive relief available). Without
such confusion, relief is unavailable.
149. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (2001). See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods.
Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995); Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769 (discussing the
Product features that are functional cannot be
functionality doctrine).
protected under federal trademark laws. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769. A
feature is functional "if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it
affects the cost or quality of the article." Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 851 n.10.
Under the Lanham Act, the trade dress owner has the burden of proving that
her trade dress is not functional. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3).
150. Functional features under trade dress law are not limited to features
that are functional on a utilitarian basis, but include features that are
functional on an aesthetic basis. See, e.g., Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164-65
(providing a discussion of the functionality doctrine).
151. 121 S. Ct. 1255 (2001).
152. TrafFix, 121 S. Ct. at 1258.
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subject of an expired utility patent."3 This design was not literally
covered by the expired patent.154 However, the plaintiff had
successfully brought suit against another competitor during the
pendency of the patent on the grounds that a similar design
15
violated the plaintiffs rights under the doctrine of equivalents.
The Court properly determined that a prior utility patent did
not qualify as an automatic bar to trade dress protection on the
grounds of functionality, although the owner would "carry the
16
heavy burden of showing that the feature is not functional."
Thus, it did not go so far as to hold that a trademark owner must
choose between patent protection and trademark protection for a
product or aesthetic design. The practical result of its decision,
however, may well be to require such selection.
The limitation of trademark protection to non-functional
configurations, like the fair use doctrine in copyright," 7 is based on
a concern over balancing owner rights with public access to the
essential building blocks of commerce.
In the instance of
trademarks, the essential building blocks include generic terms for
the goods and services being offered," 8 and aesthetic and
utilitarian elements of trade dress."'
The Court drew an
appropriate balance in Tra[Fix between these conflicting interests.
By recognizing that the existence of a patent raised a substantial
burden of proof on a trademark owner to establish nonfunctionality, the Court gave proper deference to competition
concerns. By rejecting a prima facie or absolutist treatment of
functionality in the face of a patent, the Court avoided
establishing a per se election doctrine. Yet the basis on which the
Court supported its decision raises a troubling specter of election
philosophy.
In supporting its decision that the plaintiffs sign stand design

153. Id.
154. Id. at 1260.

155. Under the doctrine of equivalents, patent infringement may exist even
if the accused product falls outside the literal terms of the patent grant.
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29-30 (1997)
(stating that the "doctrine of equivalents" is applied to each element of the

patent claim, not the invention itself).
156. TrafFix, 121 S. Ct. at 1260.
157. See supra notes 12, 79-96 and accompanying text.

158. Generic trademarks consist of the common descriptive term that
describes the genus of the product.
Generic marks never acquire
distinctiveness regardless of the mark's length of use because of the mark's

highly descriptive nature and the perception that competitors need to use the
same terms to describe their own goods. See, e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch, 537

F.2d at 9-10 (describing the generic marks and applying the doctrine of
impossibility to generic marks). See also A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808
F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding the term "chocolate fudge" generic for soda
because it is a genus for such beverage).
159. See supra notes 149-50.
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was not protectable under federal trademark doctrines, the Court
in TrafFix focused on the differences in protection afforded under
patent and trademark laws:
The Lanham [Federal Trademark] Act does not exist to reward
manufacturers for their innovation in creating a particular device,
that is the purpose of the patent law and its period of exclusivity.
The Lanham Act, furthermore, does not protect trade dress in a
functional design simply because an investment has been made to
encourage the public to associate a particular functional feature
with a single manufacturer or seller. 160
The Court, however, seemed to maintain its right to consider
the election doctrine at a later date, noting:
TrafFix and some of its amici argue that the Patent Clause of the
Constitution, of its own force, prohibits the holder of an expired
utility patent from claiming trade dress protection. We need not
resolve this question. If, despite the rule that functional features
may not be the subject of trade dress protection, a case arises in
which trade dress becomes the practical equivalent of an expired
utility patent, that will be time enough to consider the matter.161
The TrafFix case raises serious concerns about the future of
trademark intersections with both patents and copyrights. The
decision is remarkable for its failure to mention the positive aspect
of trademark protection-their role as source designators that
provide consumers shorthand information about the quality of the
product at issue. To the contrary, in both Wal-Mart and TrafFix,
the Court clearly perceives trademark protection as potentially
harmful-a property right that must be closely controlled.
Moreover, although TrafFix dealt solely with the issue of the
intersection between utility patents and trademarks, its concern
about leaving expired inventions available for copying has equal
applicability to the treatment of characters covered by expired
copyright. 6 ' The Court stressed:
Trade dress protection must subsist with the recognition that in
many instances there is no prohibition against copying goods and
products. In general, unless an intellectual property right such as a
patent or copyright protects an item, it will be subject to copying.
As the Court has explained, copying is not always discouraged or
disfavored by the laws that preserve our competitive economy.
Allowing competitors to copy will have salutary effects in many
instances. "Reverse engineering of chemical and mechanical articles
in the public domain often leads to significant advances in
technology." 63

160.
161.
162.
163.

TrafFix, 121 S. Ct. at 1262-63.
Id. at 1263 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
TrafFix, 121 S. Ct. at 1260 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
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This same analysis would, on its face, appear to apply to the
extension of trademark protection to copyrighted characters and
works whose term of copyright protection has expired.
Like
utilitarian designs, such characters earn whatever secondary
meaning they may develop as a result of a monopoly granted
under another branch of intellectual property law. Except for
useful articles,'64 the generally expressive (as opposed to
utilitarian) nature of the works should make their continued
protection of less concern with regard to the competitive necessity
for free access to such works."' Nevertheless, given what appears
to be a disturbing trend toward requiring election whenever patent
protection is available, continued trademark protection for such
works is by no means a certainty.
VI. RECONFIGURING THE BALANCE
The stakes have changed in the matter of IPR protection.
With the advent of a globalized economy, errors in protection have
the potential for being magnified one hundred fold. Historically,
intellectual property protection has never been as monolithic as its
critics contend. Indeed, as this Article demonstrates in a very
abbreviated manner, the history of intellectual property protection
is a story of constant efforts to balance and re-balance creators'
rights with the public interest in free use of their works.'66
Current efforts to expand the bases for fair use of such works,
including efforts to expand the right to use so-called "generic"
versions of patent protectable drugs, ' could be seen as simply
another example of this historical balancing process. Yet, the
United States can ill afford the growing hostility to IPR protection
that is evident in some of its most recent decisions.
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989)).
164. See supra notes 114-117 and accompanying text.

165. The contention by some, however, that all works are derivative, and
must be freely available for use by
cuts against this argument. This
swath through otherwise protectable
166. See supra notes 21, 79-96 and

others to create new "derivative" works,
contention cuts an unacceptably broad
works. See supra notes 12, 57.
accompanying text.

167. Current debates about the availability of so-called generic drugs for
treating AIDS and other diseases have nothing to do with the right to market

"generic" drugs after issuance of the patent. It has to do with the right to
license others to market patented drugs under a compulsory license.

International standards permit compulsory licensing in the event of national
emergencies, subject to stringent safeguards to balance the patent owner's
right to compensation for the exploitation of his invention. TRIPS, supra note
6, art. 31(b), 33 I.L.M. at 95. Efforts to expand "fair use" concepts to patented
drugs, and thereby eliminate any compensation to the patent owner for the
sale of such "generic" drugs, violate current international standards. They

might also have dire consequences on the ability to raise private funds to
develop future drug cures, especially given the extremely high research and
development costs in the area. See supra note 60.
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Beneath the current unacknowledged
trend toward
resurrection of the doctrine of election is a dangerous view of IPR
as something that must be contained in order to reduce its anticompetitive potential.
Differences in the goals between IPR
protection under its various forms copyrights, patents,
trademarks and trade secrets - are viewed as rights created
simply to be abused by competitors who seek to extend their
monopolies. This hostility ignores the incentivizing nature of IPR
and may auger a return to the days of the Nine Patent No No's
when patent owners faced hostility from the Department of Justice
for their efforts to license new technology.'" It also ignores the
different nature of each form of intellectual property: each form
was created to protect a particular aspect of intellectual
productivity. Thus, trademark protection for a design protectable
under another category of IPR does not unduly expand the legal
monopoly granted by other IPR rights. Patent protection does not
automatically give rise to trademark protection because the design
that is the subject of the patent must serve as a source designator
before such trademark protection arises. Use alone does not make
a design a source designator.
Instead, the design must be
distinctive of the product and it must be used as a trademark. 69'
Copyright protection does not give rise to automatic trademark
protection for the same reason.
Moreover, neither patent nor copyright protection addresses
the use of the protected object as a source designator. The patent
grant is designed to protect the owner's right to use or prohibit the
use of the invention. ° Similarly, copyright protects the owner's
right to use or prohibit the use of the expression contained in the
work.17 ' Avoiding abuse of the trademark right does not require a
duty of election. It merely requires careful application of preexisting doctrines of distinctiveness to assure that only those
elements whose prior use has given rise to a source identifying
function are protected.
The pro-competitive nature of incentivization must be given
its due if any balance is to be struck between free public access
and creator's rights. If the potential for economic exploitation is

168. Anthony, supra note 40 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2001) (defining a trademark as "[a]ny word,
name, symbol or device, or any combination thereof, used.., to identify and
distinguish his or her goods ... from those manufactured or sold by others and
to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown"). See also
supra notes 134, 135 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2001) (permitting relief for infringement
even when the patent owner refuses to license or use his or her rights to the
patent).
171. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2001) (defining acts that give rise to copyright
liability).
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removed by over-broad "fair use" rights,
then much of the
incentives for the labor and/or capital intensive creation of new
intellectual products will be eliminated. While uncompensated
alternatives may be available for the creation of such works, the
developmental potential of these alternatives is untried to say the
least. To trust much of our technological developments to such
untested methods seems particularly foolhardy in a century
marked by the increasing pace of technological advances.
Moreover, as demonstrated by the open source movement in
software development, such alternatives are not precluded under
current protection regimes. By contrast, if the balance moves too
far to the side of free public access, incentive-based creation will be
severely curtailed.
While, as a developed nation, the United States may be
willing (and even able) to gamble with its economic and
technological future by tipping the balance more strongly toward
public access, we cannot be assured that such gamble will be
limited to our own borders. To the contrary, since the beginning of
the negotiations of the Uruguay Round, which ultimately led to
the TRIPS Agreement, IPR protection has become increasingly
internationalized.173 There is a strong possibility that other, less
developed countries will be tempted to try the same gamble.
Those countries cannot afford to postpone the commercial and
industrial benefits intellectual property protection affords. While
TRIPS did not remove the ability of countries to set domestic
policy in the area of IPR protection,174 the reality is that the postTRIPS world is a vastly different place. Domestic IPR policy is no
longer created in a vacuum (if it ever was).
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Sony Corp., which
carved out a limited personal use exception for the time shifting of
public broadcast television programs,'75 the issue of the scope of a
personal use exception has been hotly debated.176
In 1994,
172. I include among this category of "fair use" rights compulsory licenses
that set compensation rates below fair market value.
173. See, e.g., Doris Estelle Long, 'Democratizing'Globalization: Practicing
the Policies of Cultural Inclusion, _
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174. In fact, there are many articles of TRIPS that specifically address in a
positive manner the ability of member countries to alter compliance with

TRIPS protection norms in order to meet domestic policy objectives. For
example, Article 27, governing international standards for patentability,
expressly excludes from protection inventions whose commercial exploitation
would be contrary to "ordre public or morality." TRIPS, supra note 6, art.
27(2), 33 I.L.M. at 94. Similarly, Article 31 permits countries to compel the

licensing of inventions for public non-commercial use and in cases of "national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme emergency." TRIPS, supra note

6, art. 31(b), 33 I.L.M. at 95.
175. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 454-55.
176. See, e.g., American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d
Cir. 1994) (noting the existence of a research exemption).
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Congress carved out another personal use exemption when it
enacted the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992.177 Under this Act,
a limited right to digitally record a lawfully obtained copy of a
sound recording onto a digital audio recording device was
granted. 17 This specific purpose legislation, however, has given
rise to renewed claims for an expanded personal use right in all
9
digital media.1
Internationally, it has helped give renewed vigor
to a personal use right that goes far beyond the limited time and
space shifting purposes for which it was first crafted domestically.
Some countries have interpreted this personal use right to include
a personal right to record and distribute personal copies of
copyrighted works, without compensation to the copyright
holder.' Clearly, this personal use right strikes at the very heart
of copyright protection. It also goes far beyond the 8 exceptions set
forth in TRIPS for the fair use of copyrighted works.1 1
In the United States, legislation is enacted virtually every
year aimed at correcting some perceived problem in the scope of
IPR protection.
The United States has the luxury of
experimentation because it can fairly quickly correct any problems
that such experimentation later uncovers.'
Even if legislation is
unavailable to correct such problems, courts often can and do
clarify the application of such laws. As a common law country, the
role of precedence plays a strong role in assuring that such
177. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10 (2001).
178. 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2001).

179. For recent cases involving defendants' claims of fair use of digital
media, see e.g., A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1014; UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp.

2d at 350.
180. Several CIS countries, including the Ukraine and Russia, have
considered broad-based personal use rights. Thus, for example Article 25 of
the Draft Ukrainian copyright law grants an uncompensated reproduction
right "for personal purposes for a regular family and for close acquaintances of

this family" of various copyrighted works. The Law of Ukraine On Copyright
and Related Rights, N 2627-III, Art. 25 (July 11, 2001), available at
http://www.welcometo.kiev.ua:8800/ili/ilic.frame-law result2.show?p-arg-nam
es=lawid&pargvalues=90.
181. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 13, 33 I.L.M. at 88. TRIPS permits fair use
only when a tri-partite test has been met. Id. The fair use must arise only in

"certain special cases."

Id. Such cases must not "conflict with a normal

exploitation of the work" and must not "unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the right holder." Id. Unbounded personal use rights undoubtedly
conflict with the normal exploitation rights of the owner since they involve the
uncompensated reproduction of a copyrighted work.
Such rights also
unreasonably prejudice the interests of the copyright owner because, as
practiced by users of Napster, they eliminate any compensation for use of the

copyrighted works. With no requirement of lawful acquisition of a copy by the
person exercising his "personal use" rights, there is no guarantee that any
legal copy will be purchased in the chain of use.
182. Thus, for example, when Congress extended the work for hire doctrine
to performers on sound recordings without adequate consideration of the

impact of such change, it then reversed its decision the following year.
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corrections are applied in a uniform manner.'83 By contrast, civil
code countries, in which precedent plays a relatively limited role,
do not generally have the ability to respond so quickly to
developments.
To the contrary, alteration of a civil code is
generally an extremely complicated process, which may take years
to accomplish. 8 4 Thus, any "errors" in protection that make it into
a civil code may reside there for years, with little, if any, ability to
alter the harm caused.
Because of the potential international consequences that
special interest legislation in the IPR area, such as the Audio
Home Recording Act may have, Congress should enact such
legislation cautiously. Part of Congress' analysis must include
consideration of the potential impact such "special rights" may
have on the international arena. The time has passed when the
United States can bury its head in the sand and pretend that what
is done has no impact beyond its borders.
VII.CONCLUSION
The internationalization of IPR protection, the globalization
of trade, and the rapidly accelerating pace of technological
development in the latter decades of the Twentieth Century have
placed new pressures on historic debates over creative
incentivization and public welfare. Current decisions under US
domestic law, which presage a resurrection of the election
obligation, and an increasing hostility toward intellectual property
protection, must be re-examined in light of these pressures.
Limiting IPR protection because of its purported anti-competitive,
anti-creative impact denigrates its importance in encouraging the
development of domestic industries based on the manufacture and
dissemination of the products of intellectual creativity. While
developed nations such as the United States may have the luxury
of making mistakes regarding the scope of protection required to
assure necessary incentivization of creativity, developing nations
cannot afford to do so. At a minimum, they may suffer a "brain
drain" as their most talented citizens flee to countries that provide
adequate compensation (exploitation rights) for their creative

183. Some "corrections" may take longer than others. The debate over the
precise application of the F.T.D.A., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c), in particular whether
the F.T.D.A. requires actual or likely dilution, remains extant over five years
after enactment of the statute. Compare Ringling Bros. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999) (requiring actual dilution), with Nabisco,

Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999) (requiring likelihood of
dilution).
184. For example, work on revisions to Russia's civil code in connection with
intellectual property rights continues after six years. The Ukraine is also
continuing its attempts to revise its civil code for intellectual property rights, a
process expected to last several years.
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endeavors. At its worst, such countries may suffer a lack of direct
foreign investment and local economic development that will place
them even further behind their more commercially advanced
neighbors.
The growing hostility to IPR protection shown by United
States courts through their recent resurrection of the obligation of
election must be corrected. Effective creative incentivization can
only occur when creators rights are given due respect, thus,
ensuring a balanced approach to the author/public welfare
dichotomy. Although absolute quantification may be impossible to
achieve, the relationship between IPR protection and creative
incentivization needs to be better understood, particularly at the
international level. Such studies will not be easy to accomplish,
given the number of variables that exist. Yet, the value of
continued efforts to quantify which types of protection encourage
which types of creative activity, is virtually incalculable. Such
future studies, however, should be designed to determine the
critical balance between incentivization and public welfare in the
most objective manner possible. A clearer ratio between fair use
and incentivization for patents and copyrights must be
determined. Such rates must be based on carefully delineated
variables whose relationship to incentivization is clearly
articulated and quantified.
Creativity is the greatest natural resource a country has. The
more we learn about how it is nurtured, encouraged, and turned
into an economically viable asset, the better chance every country
has to develop this critical, and yet often under used, natural
resource.

